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I. INTRODUCTION
Federal Indian law is dynamic, and though few outside the field
acknowledge it, cutting edge.1 In the last few decades, coinciding with
the rise of Indian gaming,2 Indian tribes, individual Indians, and In-
1. See generally DAVID H. GETCHES, CHARLES F. WILKINSON & ROBERT A. WILLIAMS,
JR., CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAw 1 (5th ed. 2005) ("The body of
federal Indian law-expressed in separate volumes of the United States Code
and the Code of Federal Regulations, in some 380 treaties, in hundreds of opin-
ions of the Solicitor of the Department of the Interior, in thousands of cases, and
in scores of law review articles-is expanding rapidly."); Lawrence R. Baca,
Thirty Years of Federal Indian Law, FED. LAW., Apr. 2005, at 28, 29 ("Since 1976,
the Supreme Court has decided more than 100 cases involving Indian law."); Eliz-
abeth A. Kronk, Hundreds of Nations, Millions of People: One Senior Judge on the
Federal Bench, FED. LAw., July 2005, at 16, 16.
2. A few Indian tribes began gaming operations as early as the late 1960s, but the
expansion of Indian gaming did not begin with great intensity until Congress
enacted the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act in 1988. STEVEN ANDREW LIGHT &
KATHRYN R.L. RAND, INDIAN GAMING AND TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY: THE CASINO COM-
PROMISE 7-8 (2005) [hereinafter LIGHT & RAND, INDIAN GAMING AND TRIBAL SOV-
EREIGNTY]; see also Brief of Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa
Indians et al. as Amicus Curiae, at 3-5, Taxpayers of Mich. Against Casinos v.
State, 685 N.W.2d 221 (Mich. 2004) (No. 122830) (discussing the history of the
Michigan Indian tribes' gaming operations); see generally Steven Andrew Light &
Kathryn R.L. Rand, Reconciling the Paradox of Tribal Sovereignty: Three
Frameworks for Developing Indian Gaming Law and Policy, 4 NEV. L.J. 262
(2003) [hereinafter Light & Rand, Reconciling the Paradox of Tribal Sovereignty];
Rebecca Tsosie, Negotiating Economic Survival: The Consent Principle and Tri-
bal-State Compacts Under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 25
(1997); Kevin K. Washburn, Federal Law, State Policy, and Indian Gaming, 4
NEV. L.J. 285 (2003); Kevin K. Washburn, Recurring Problems in Indian Gaming,
1 Wyo. L. REV. 427 (2001) [hereinafter Washburn, Recurring Problems in Indian
Gaming].
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dian-owned businesses have acted far beyond the direction of statutes
and agency promulgations. Indians and Indian tribes are too ener-
getic and resourceful to wait for Congress or the agencies to make pol-
icy decisions. 3 Federal Indian law and policy is no longer driven by
Congress, the bureaucracy, or even the states.4 Indian tribes lead the
way and the rest have to catch up.5 It appears that Congress and the
Executive Branch may never catch up,6 having already adopted a re-
actionary approach to deal with Indian issues by relying more on case-
specific legislation 7 and claims adjudication in the administrative
courts.8 Now that Indian actors lead the way, there may never be an-
other time when Congress or the President makes broad, sweeping
changes to federal Indian policy.9
3. See, e.g., Bill O'Brien & Christine Finger, Tribes Jointly Pursue Plans for Romu-
lus Casino: 1994 Agreement Allows Groups to Share Profits, TRAVERSE CITY RE-
CORD-EAGLE (Mich.), June 28, 2005, http://www.record-eagle.com/2005/jun/
28casino.htm.
4. Cf. CHARLES WILKINSON, BLOOD STRUGGLE: THE RISE OF MODERN INDIAN NATIONS
271-72 (2005) ("Professor Joseph Kalt, codirector of the Harvard Project on
American Indian Economic Development at the Kennedy School of Government,
reported: 'We cannot find a single case of sustained economic development where
the tribe is not in the driver's seat . . . .'" (quoting Economic Development on
Indian Reservations: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 104th Cong.
6-7 (1996))).
5. ROBERT N. CLINTON, CAROLE E. GOLDBERG & REBECCA TsoSIE, AMERICAN INDIAN
LAW: NATIVE NATIONS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM: CASES AND MATERIALS, at xv
(4th ed. 2003) ("During the past decade, tribal governments and their legal sys-
tems have expanded in size and sophistication and their business enterprises,
particularly in the gaming industry, have exploded. Tribes have become increas-
ingly self-sufficient and far less reliant on the federal government both for fund-
ing and technical assistance."); cf. Edwin Kneedler, Indian Law in the Last Thirty
Years: How Cases Get to the Supreme Court and How They are Briefed, 28 AM.
INDIAN L. REV. 274, 279-80 (2003) ("So much of the law concerning Indian tribal
sovereignty has been judge made. The Court has had many decisions over the last
twenty or thirty years articulating the scope of tribal sovereignty where there has
not been any act of Congress or treaty on the subject, and all the Court could rely
upon were its own prior decisions.").
6. See MARK TUSHNET, THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 22 (2003) ("Partisan polar-
ization and divided government have obvious implications for the lawmaking pro-
cess: Only initiatives that have bipartisan support are likely to be enacted, and
polarization makes it difficult to assemble a bipartisan majority for major policy
initiatives.").
7. See, e.g., S. 113, 109th Cong. (2005) (modifying the date as of which certain tribal
land of the Lytton Rancheria of California is deemed to be held in trust); H.R.
680, 109th Cong. (2005) (directing the Secretary of Interior to convey certain land
held in trust for the Paiute Indian Tribe of Utah to the City of Richfield, Utah,
and for other purposes).
8. E.g., Turning Stone Casino Resort, No. 04-1000 (OSHRC Nov. 1, 2004), 21 OSHC
(BNA) 1059 (Apr. 18, 2005); Miccosukee Resort & Convention Ctr., 9 O.C.A.H.O.
1114, 2004 WL 3312070 (2004); San Manuel Indian Bingo & Casino, 341 N.L.R.B.
No. 138, 2004 WL 1283584 (2004).
9. As Justice Thomas stated, "Federal Indian policy is, to say the least, schizo-
phrenic." United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 219 (2004) (Thomas, J., concur-
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As an institution, federal courts are reactionary.1O They cannot
decide an issue without a party bringing suit in the first instance.
And, though it is the Court's job to interpret the Constitution, in the
Indian cases the Court has little or no constitutional text to interpret.
Indian tribes in recent decades have outpaced the law in many ways.
Through their commitment to tribal self-determination, Congress and
the Executive have opened the door-and tribes have finally sprinted
through." Each tribe is a laboratory for self-determination,12 busi-
ness ideas,13 and intergovernmental relations. 14 As a result, the fed-
ring). See also Saikrishna Prakash, Against Tribal Fungibility, 89 CORNELL L.
REV. 1069, 1117 (2004) ("[Flederal Indian policy has been highly cyclical, moving
from extreme measures to assimilate Indians and end Indian tribal autonomy to
the eventual resurrection of Indian tribes and implementation of policies meant
to foster Indian self-government. These wild swings in federal Indian policy do
not speak well of federal control." (footnotes omitted)). Numerous scholars have
harshly criticized-and with good reason-federal Indian policy choices made by
Congress and the Executive Branch. See Sandra L. Cadwalader, Preface to THE
AGGRESSIONS OF CILIZATION: FEDERAL INDIAN POLICY SINCE THE 1880s, at ix
(Sandra L. Cadwalader & Vine Deloria, Jr., eds., 1984); Bethany R. Berger, In-
dian Policy and the Imagined Indian Woman, 14 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 103
(2004); Raymond Cross, The Federal Trust Duty in an Age of Indian Self-Determi-
nation: An Epitaph for a Dying Doctrine?, 39 TULSA L. REV. 369, 372-73 (2003);
Robert B. Porter, A Proposal to the Hanodaganyas to Decolonize Federal Indian
Control Law, 31 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 899, 920-39 (1999).
10. See TUSHNET, supra note 6, at 93 ("The Supreme Court can aggressively exercise
the power of judicial review only when its members think that government's
power is narrow (relative to the views of legislators) and members of legislatures
think that broader exercises of power are both good public policy and constitu-
tionally permissible.").
11. See generally WILEINSON, supra note 4.
12. See, e.g., Wenona T. Singel, Labor Relations and Tribal Self-Governance, 80 N.D.
L. REV. 691, 725-29 (2004) (discussing ways for tribes to solve labor disputes
through the exercise of self-determination).
13. See John F. Petoskey, Doing Business with Michigan Indian Tribes, MICH. B.J.,
May 1997, at 440; Nancy Gohring, Tribes Weigh High Technology as an Economic
Spark Plug, SEATrLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, May 15, 2003, at D1, available at
2003 WLNR 2950609; Lorie Graham, Securing Economic Sovereignty Through
Agreement, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY (Oneida, N.Y.), Sept. 10, 2003, at A4; Mastin
Paskind, Indian Role in New Mexico Business Changing, ALBUQUERQUE J., May
15, 1995, at 10, available at 1995 WLNR 2032015.
14. Some intergovernmental agreements between Indian tribes and states include,
for example, the Intergovernmental Accord between the Tribal Leaders of the
Federally Recognized Indian Tribes in the State of Michigan and the Governor of
the State of Michigan Concerning Economic Development Interests, May 13,
2005 (on file with author); Intergovernmental Accord between the Federally Rec-
ognized Indian Tribes in Michigan and the Governor of the State of Michigan
Concerning Protection of Shared Water Resources, May 12, 2004, http://www.
michigan.gov/documents/Accord_91058_7.pdf; Tax Agreement between the Little
Traverse Bay Bands of Odawa Indians and the State of Michigan, Dec. 20, 2002,
https://www.michigan.gov/documentsLTBB-Agreement_58762-7.pdf. One ex-
ample of an intergovernmental agreement between Indian tribes from both the
United States and Canada is the Tribal and First Nations Great Lakes Water
[Vol. 85:121
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eral courts have had fewer and fewer authorities to rely on to decide
disputes, opening the door for the Supreme Court to exercise addi-
tional latitude in deciding Indian cases according to its own prefer-
ences.' 5 The anchor preventing the Court from taking the law into its
own hands-the decades of federal law and policy dictating to tribes
how to civilize themselves-has begun to rust away.
And yet it is a dangerous time for Indian tribes.
Observers of the current state of Indian affairs are aware that In-
dian gaming underlies nearly all of the major issues facing Indian
Accord, Nov. 23, 2004, http://www.ltbbodawa-nsn.gov/announcements/Tribal%20
and%20First%2ONations%20Great%20Lakes%20Water%2Accord%20112304d.
pdf.
Other intergovernmental agreements are discussed by a variety of other au-
thorities. See JEFFREY S. ASHLEY & SECODY J. HUBBARD, NEGOTIATED SOVER-
EIGNTY: WORKING TO IMPROVE TRIBAL-STATE RELATIONS (2004); AM. INDIAN LAW
CTR., INC., COMM'N ON TRIBAL-STATE RELATIONS, STATE-TRIBAL AGREEMENTS: A
COMPREHENSIVE STUDY (1981); CONFERENCE OF W. ATTORNEYS GEN., AMERICAN
INDIAN LAW DESKBOOK 500-31 (Clay Smith ed., 3d ed. 2004); P.S. Deloria & Rob-
ert Laurence, Negotiating Tribal-State Full Faith and Credit Agreements: The
Topology of the Negotiation and the Merits of the Question, 28 GA. L. REV. 365
(1994); Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Power to Tax, the Power to Destroy, and the
Michigan Tribal-State Tax Agreements, 82 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 1 (2004); B.
Kevin Gover et al., Gover, Stetson and Williams, P.C., Tribal-State Dispute Reso-
lution: Recent Attempts, 36 S.D. L. Rev. 277 (1991); Joel H. Mack & Gwyn Good-
son Timms, Cooperative Agreements: Government-to-Government Relations to
Foster Reservation Business Development, 20 PEPP. L. REV. 1295 (1993); W. Dale
Mason, Tribes and States: A New Era in Intergovernmental Affairs, 28 PUBLIUS
111 (1998); Daniel McCool, Intergovernmental Conflict and Indian Water Rights:
An Assessment of Negotiated Settlements, 23 PUBLIus 85 (1993); June M. Mick-
ens, Tribal and State Intergovernmental Child Support Agreements: The Process
Behind the Contract, 9 AM. J. FAM. L. 11 (1995); David E. Wilkins, Reconsidering
the Tribal-State Compact Process, 22 POL'Y STUD. J. 474 (1994); see generally T.
ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, SEMBLANCES OF SOVEREIGNTY: THE CONSTITUTION, THE
STATE, AND AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP 140-42 (2002); AM. INDIAN LAW CTR., COMM'N
ON STATE-TRIBAL RELATIONS, HANDBOOK ON STATE-TRIBAL RELATIONS (1984);
Frank Pommersheim, Tribal-State Relations: Hope for the Future?, 36 S.D. L.
REV. 239 (1991); Note, Intergovernmental Compacts in Native American Law:
Models for Expanded Usage, 112 HARV. L. REV. 922 (1999).
15. Edwin Kneedler stated:
AS we know, in the area of Indian law, a statute or treaty seldom sup-
plies a specific answer to a case. The relevant statute or treaty was typi-
cally adopted against the background of certain premises and
understandings that, you can be fairly sure, were on the mind of the
legislators or the treaty drafters at the time, but they didn't put it in
writing. Because this is a Court that wants to find the answers in text
rather than suppositions about what the drafters might have thought,
there often is less to go on for a tribe or for the United States on behalf of
tribes. As a result, there may actually have been more latitude for the
Court in deciding Indian cases.
Kneedler, supra note 5, at 278.
2006]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:121
tribes in their relations with federal, state, and local governments. 16
Huge ethics scandals involving high-ranking Republican leaders re-
late directly back to the use and abuse of Indian gaming revenues.17
Already huge land claims in New York and elsewhere are being af-
fected by the potential to use recovered lands for gaming operations.1 8
Gaming politics also interfere with the quest for federal recognition of
historically oppressed Indian tribes.19 State governments are looking
to wealthy Indian tribes as cash cows to balance state budgets. 2o The
taking of land into trust for the benefit of Indian tribes-one the most
important provisions of the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA)-has
been virtually shut down by the politics of (and derivative litigation
involving) Indian gaming.2 1 Purely internal tribal matters, such as
16. See generally Indian Gaming Regulation-Part I: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Indian Affairs, 109th Cong. (2005) (statements of Dr. Steven A. Light and
Kathryn R.L. Rand), available at 2005 WLNR 6576218.
17. See David Brooks, Masters of Sleaze, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2005, at A23, available
at 2005 WLNR 4396172; Frank Rich, Op-Ed, Get Tom DeLay to the Church on
Time, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2005, § 4, at 14, available at 2005 WLNR 5982822.
18. See Charles V. Bagli, Deal by Wisconsin Oneidas May Clear Way for Casino, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 19, 2003, at B5, available at 2003 WLNR 5666418; James C. McKin-
ley, Jr., Tribe and Pataki Near Deal on Land and Casino, N.Y. TIMES, May 8,
2003, at B1, available at 2003 WLNR 5246231; cf. Cayuga Indian Nation of N.Y.
v. Pataki, 413 F.3d 266 (2d Cir. 2005).
19. See Roberto Iraola, The Administrative Tribal Recognition Process and the
Courts, 38 AKRON L. REV. 867, 869 (2005); Recognition of Indian Tribes: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 109th Cong. (2005) (statement of Richard
L. Velky, Chief, Schaghticoke Tribal Nation), available at 2005 WLNR 7437238.
20. See In Minnesota as Elsewhere, Standing Up to Governors is a Good Idea, INDIAN
COUNTRY TODAY (Oneida, N.Y.), May 25, 2005, at A2, available at 2005 WLNR
8288737 ("The solution in the minds of politicians and other special interest
groups in the various states that contain Native nations is to go after whatever
assets and revenues Indian tribal governments and member associations pres-
ently hold, and work to impose fees, taxes and any and all manner of tentacles
upon such sovereign properties."); Glenn Coin, Casinomania: A Casino in Every
Neighborhood, Hope for Money in Every Coffer, POST-STANDARD (Syracuse, N.Y.),
Jan. 12, 2003, at Al ("State legislators and the governor are betting that the
largest expansion of gambling in state history will help resolve the state's fiscal
crunch."); Amy Lane, State Looks to Indian Casinos to Add Revenue, CRAIN'S DE-
TROIT Bus., Apr. 14, 2003, at 6 (discussing how Michigan Governor Jennifer
Granholm and the Michigan Legislature "are looking to Michigan's American In-
dian tribes as potential revenue sources").
21. See, e.g., Taxpayers of Mich. Against Casinos v. Norton, 433 F.3d 852 (D.C. Cir.
2006) (affirming taking of trust land for benefit of Pokagon Band of Potawatomi
Indians); Carcieri v. Norton, 398 F.3d 22 (1st Cir. 2005) (affirming taking of trust
land for benefit of Narragansett Indian Tribe); cf. Off-Reservation Indian Gam-
ing: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 109th Cong. (2005) (state-
ment of George T. Skibine, Acting Deputy Secretary for Indian Affairs, Dep't of
the Interior) ("Finally, please keep in mind the fact that although the Depart-
ment has approved a trust acquisition for an Indian tribe it does not necessarily
mean that the land has actually been taken into trust. For instance, the exis-
tence of liens or other encumbrances, or litigation challenging the Secretary's de-
cision may delay the proposed trust acquisition, often for years.").
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membership questions, are affected by gaming. 22 Some wealthy tribes
use gaming revenues in efforts to influence state elections. 23 Finally,
and most importantly, the backlash against Indian gaming feared
since its early days is now here and flourishing.24
Concurrent with these recent events is the hyper-politicization of
federal Indian law. Until the 1977 case of Delaware Tribal Business
Committee v. Weeks,25 the Supreme Court treated Indian cases with a
soft touch, preferring to leave the policy choices to Congress and the
Executive, often invoking the political-question doctrine in refusing to
review the constitutionality of Indian legislation. 26 But the explicit
rejection of the political-question doctrine in Weeks was a signal of a
22. See Alvarado v. Table Mountain Rancheria, No. C 05-00093 MHP, 2005 WL
1806368, at *2 (N.D. Cal. July 28, 2005); Quair v. Sisco, 359 F. Supp. 2d 948, 952
(E.D. Cal. 2004); Ackerman v. Edwards, 17 Cal. Rptr. 3d 517, 519 (Ct. App. 2004);
Salinas v. Lamere, No. RIC 406255, slip op. at *3 (Cal. Super. Ct. July 23, 2004)
(on file with author); Jerry Bier, Indians' Lawsuit Targets Rancheria, FRESNO
BEE, Jan. 30, 2005, at B3 (discussing Alvarado).
23. See John M. Broder, Tribes Now Ready to Deal With Their New Governor, N.Y.
TIMEs, Nov. 9, 2003, at N18, available at 2003 WLNR 5666987 ("A small number
of California's Indian tribes, by spending $12 million to defeat Mr. Schwarzeneg-
ger in the recall election, may have done more to ensure his victory than any
other group, political analysts said. A total of $84 million was spent on the elec-
tion, with Indian gambling interests the single largest contributor.").
24. See WILKINSON, supra note 4, at 336-38, 344-45; John Fredericks III, America's
First Nations: The Origins, History and Future of American Indian Sovereignty, 7
J.L. & POL'v 347, 406 (1999); Light & Rand, Reconciling the Paradox of Tribal
Sovereignty, supra note 2, at 263-64; Kathryn R.L. Rand & Steven A. Light, Vir-
tue or Vice? How IGRA Shapes the Politics of Native American Gaming, Sover-
eignty, and Identity, 4 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 381, 406-07 (1997); see also 151
CONG. REC. S13389, S13390 (daily ed. Nov. 18, 2005) (statement of Sen. McCain)
(noting a "backlash against Indian gaming generally").
25. 430 U.S. 73, 83-85 (1977) (citing Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974), and
United States v. Alcea Band of Tillamooks, 329 U.S. 40 (1946), as examples of
cases where the Court had reviewed congressional legislation in Indian affairs);
see also United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 413 (1980)
("Thus, it seems that the Court's conclusive presumption of congressional good
faith was based in large measure on the idea that relations between this Nation
and the Indian tribes are a political matter, not amenable to judicial review.
That view, of course, has long since been discredited in takings cases, and was
expressly laid to rest in [Weeks]."); Robert Laurence, The Unseemly Nature of Res-
ervation Diminishment by Judicial, as Opposed to Legislative, Fiat and the Ironic
Role of the Indian Civil Rights Act in Limiting Both, 71 N.D. L. REV. 393, 400
n.41 (1995) (discussing judicial review of disputes between Congress and Indian
tribes); Frank Pommersheim, Tribal Courts and the Federal Judiciary: Opportu-
nities and Challenges for a Constitutional Democracy, 58 MONT. L. REV. 313, 320
n.30 (1997) (same); Alex Tallchief Skibine, Integrating the Indian Trust Doctrine
into the Constitution, 39 TULSA L. REV. 247, 255 (2003) (same); Comment, Federal
Plenary Power in Indian Affairs after Weeks and Sioux Nation, 131 U. PA. L.
REV. 235, 241 (1982) (same).
26. See, e.g., Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565 (1903) ("Plenary authority
over the tribal relations of the Indians has been exercised by Congress from the
beginning, and the power has always been deemed a political one, not subject to
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parallel phenomenon-the increasing tendency of the Court to make
policy in the field of federal Indian law. 2 7 The Court's entrance into
the field of federal Indian policy is unwelcome, largely because the
Court's policy choices are frequently uneducated in terms of their on-
the-ground impacts, 28 but also because they are in direct contraven-
tion of explicit congressional and Executive Branch policy choices.2 9
Professor Philip P. Frickey argued in 1990 that congressional in-
tent rarely provided much guidance to the Court in some of the cases
this Article discusses. 30 His analysis of the Court's cases did not
touch upon the explicit statements of congressional and Executive
Branch federal Indian policy.31 He proposed to "construct an an-
tiformalist alternative for federal Indian law scholarship by relying
upon recent writings about practical legal reasoning."32 But more re-
cently, Professor Frickey declared that "it is exceedingly doubtful that
. . . judicial solutions are among [the answers]" to the problem of
American Indian law.3 3
In contrast to Professor Frickey's earlier proposal, this Article pro-
poses that the Court should follow congressional and Executive
be controlled by the judicial department of the government."); United States v.
Holliday, 70 U.S. 407 (1865).
27. See Philip P. Frickey, (Native) American Exceptionalism in Federal Public Law,
119 H~Av. L. REV. 431, 436 (2005) [hereinafter Frickey, (Native) American Excep-
tionalism]; Philip P. Frickey, Doctrine, Context, Institutional Relationships, and
Commentary: The Malaise of Federal Indian Law Through the Lens of Lone Wolf,
38 TULSA L. REV. 5, 33 (2002); David H. Getches, Beyond Indian Law: The Rehn-
quist Court's Pursuit of States' Rights, Color-Blind Justice and Mainstream Val-
ues, 86 MiNN. L. REV. 267, 361 (2001) [hereinafter Getches, Beyond Indian Law];
David H. Getches, Conquering the Cultural Frontier: The New Subjectivism of the
Supreme Court in Indian Law, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1573, 1576 (1996) [hereinafter
Getches, Conquering the Cultural Frontier]; Laurence, supra note 25; Joseph Wil-
liam Singer, Double Bind: Indian Nations v. The Supreme Court, 119 HARv. L.
REV. F. 1, 2 (2005), available at http://www.harvardlawreview.org/forum/issues/
119/dec05/singer.pdf; David E. Wilkins, The Reinvigoration of the Doctrine of'Im-
plied Repeals:' A Requiem for Indigenous Treaty Rights, 43 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 1,
7 (1999); Jeannette Wolfley, Rice v. Cayetano: The Supreme Court Declines to
Extend Federal Indian Law Principles to Native Hawaiians Sovereign Rights, 3
AsLAN-PAc. L. & POL'Y J. 359 (2002).
28. See Kronk, supra note 1, at 17 ("Indian Country and individual American Indians
are suffering as a result of a federal bench that is 'ill-equipped' to handle cases
involving federal Indian law.").
29. Cf. TUSHNET, supra note 6, at 95 ("The Court's strong theory of judicial
supremacy meshes reasonably well with its generalized suspicion of legislators,
interest groups, and politics because it explains to the Court why it is the proper
forum for deciding again questions already addressed by politicians.").
30. Philip P. Frickey, Congressional Intent, Practical Reasoning, and the Dynamic
Nature of Federal Indian Law, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1137, 1142 (1990).
31. Id. at 1142-74. Professor Frickey also discussed the Indian Civil Rights Act, id.
at 1157-60, 1163, and the Act of Aug. 15, 1953, id. at 1165-68.
32. Id. at 1142.
33. Frickey, (Native) American Exceptionalism, supra note 27, at 490.
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Branch federal Indian policy when confronted with cases where no
treaty, statute, or regulation controls, proposing a test based on lan-
guage contained in Justice Thomas's concurrence in United States v.
Lara.34 Particularly in the area of federal Indian law known as inher-
ent tribal authority, as limited by the doctrine of implicit divesti-
ture,35 this new analytical structure would allow the Court to make
decisions that more closely parallel the national interest as identified
in explicit statements of federal Indian policy.
Part II of this Article describes current federal Indian policy as ar-
ticulated in the collection of federal statutes, regulations, and other
official pronouncements issued by Congress and the Executive since
1970. These statements of federal Indian policy are supportive of tri-
bal self-determination, tribal economic development, and tribal court
development. Part III argues that the Supreme Court has increas-
ingly acted as the leading federal Indian policymaker, leading to un-
welcome results for the federal government, Indians, Indian tribes,
states, and non-Indians. The Court's federal common law cases often
contravene express federal Indian policy. Part IV demonstrates that
the unusual extraconstitutional status of Indian tribes and the limited
constitutional authority for federal government both open the door for
the Court to act as a sort of plenary federal Indian policymaker. Part
IV also describes and critiques the tenuous middle ground that a bare
majority of the Supreme Court is willing to follow in relation to the
plenary and exclusive authority of Congress to make federal Indian
law and policy-a sort of preconstitutional federal power. Part V pro-
poses that the Supreme Court adopt, in part, Justice Thomas's propo-
sal for a "consistent-with-federal-policy" test, whereby the Court
would not restrict tribal inherent authority absent express federal In-
dian policy to the contrary. This test relieves the Court of its uncom-
fortable and unwelcome policymaking activities in Indian cases and
would produce results more indicative of federal Indian policy. 3 6
34. 541 U.S. 193 (2004).
35. See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 326 (1978) (defining "implicit divesti-
ture" as "that part of sovereignty which the Indians implicitly lost by virtue of
their dependent status").
36. Other commentators have proposed numerous alternatives for the Court to con-
sider in its Indian law canon, but none in the vein of explicitly endorsing congres-
sional and Executive Branch federal Indian policy. See, e.g., ALEINIKOFF, supra
note 14, at 145-49 (arguing for the expansion of nonmember political participa-
tion rights in tribal governments); Hope M. Babcock, A Civic-Republican Vision
of "Domestic Dependent Nations" in the Twenty-First Century: Tribal Sovereignty
Re-envisioned, Reinvigorated, and Re-empowered, 2005 UTAH L. REV. 443, 559-69
(urging Congress or the Court to authorize Indian tribes to "nullify" laws or ac-
tions that infringe on tribal sovereignty); Robert Laurence, Symmetry and Asym-
metry in Federal Indian Law, 42 ARIZ. L. REV. 861 (2000) [hereinafter Laurence,
Symmetry and Asymmetry] (blending notions of symmetry and asymmetry into
federal Indian law); Robert Laurence, Federal Court Review of Tribal Activity
2006]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
For the purposes of this Article, "federal Indian policy" refers to the
express statements of policy or congressional findings contained in
acts of Congress related to Indians, Indian tribes, and Indian tribal
organizations. On occasion, Senate or House reports accompanying
legislation will be discussed, but as a general matter, legislative his-
tory will not be considered "federal Indian policy."
II. FEDERAL POLICY ON INDIAN AFFAIRS
The political branches of the United States-the Executive and the
Legislative-tend to make the policy decisions for the entire country
on matters of broad national concern. 37 In Marbury v. Madison,3
8
Chief Justice Marshall stated that some cases are of a class that fed-
eral courts cannot review because "the[ir] subjects are political."39
The Justices of the Supreme Court and the judges of the lower federal
courts are not popularly elected, unlike the officials from the other two
branches. 40 In a perfect federal system, the federal courts would not
be placed in the position of deciding what is best for the nation, and
thus making federal policy. The Court is aware that it does not have
Under the Indian Civil Rights Act, 68 N.D. L. REV. 657 (1992) (arguing for limited
federal court judicial review of tribal court decisions); Robert Laurence, Martinez,
Oliphant, and Federal Court Review of Tribal Activity Under the Indian Civil
Rights Act, 10 CAMPBELL L. REV. 411 (1988) (same); Frank Pommersheim, Consti-
tutional Shadows: The Missing Narrative in Indian Law, 80 N.D. L. REV. 743,
757-58 (2004) (arguing for a constitutional amendment to provide for tribal
rights); Joseph William Singer, Canons of Conquest: The Supreme Court's Attack
on Tribal Sovereignty, 37 NEW ENG. L. REV. 641, 660-65 (2003) (arguing for a
property-based approach to reviewing tribal sovereignty); Alex Tallchief Skibine,
The Dialogic of Federalism in Federal Indian Law and the Rehnquist Court: The
Need for Coherence and Integration, 8 TEx. J. C.L. & C.R. 1 (2003) (arguing that
the Court should include tribal rights to self-government under the First Amend-
ment freedom-of-association rubric); Note, International Law as an Interpretive
Force in Federal Indian Law, 116 HARv. L. REV. 1751, 1755 (2003) (arguing that
the Court should apply international law principles to its Indian law cases). But
see Peter Nicolas, American-Style Justice in No Man's Land, 36 GA. L. REV. 895
(2002) (identifying policy and legal problems in federal Indian law but offering no
proposed solution).
37. See David S. Tatel, Judicial Methodology, Southern School Desegregation, and
the Rule of Law, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1071, 1074-75 (2004) ("[L]ife-tenured judges
from across the political spectrum maximize the extent to which their decisions
are driven not by personal policy agendas, but by the application of law to estab-
lished fact. Critical to the principle of judicial restraint, these standards help
federal courts avoid intruding on the policymaking function and retain the credi-
bility they need to serve in our democracy as the arbiter of constitutional issues
and the ultimate protector of constitutional rights." (citations omitted)).
38. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
39. Id. at 166.
40. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; id. art. III, § 1.
[Vol. 85:121
FEDERAL INDIAN POLICY
the institutional capacity that Congress and the Executive have to
make intelligent and wise decisions about federal policy.41
There are exceptions to the Court's reluctance to engage in explicit
policymaking. For example, the Court adopted a substantive due pro-
cess analysis in Lochner v. New York,42 now hailed as a low point in
Supreme Court jurisprudence. 43 In Lochner-era cases, the Court sec-
ond-guessed the political branches of the federal government in de-
claring hundreds of state economic regulations unconstitutional.44
Another exception is more contemporary-federal Indian policy.
In the last three decades, beginning in force around the mid-1970s
with then-Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Moe v. Confederated Salish
& Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation,45 the Court has made
broad statements of policy, often in contravention of explicit congres-
sional policy. These statements include determining how much inher-
ent tribal authority an Indian tribe retains;4 6 determining the
territorial scope of Indian Country;47 and, perhaps most importantly,
determining to what degree state law and authority extends into In-
dian Country.48 Most recently, the Court rejected an attempt by the
Oneida Indian Nation to seek tax immunities from local governments
on reservation lands on the policy basis that the Nation waited too
long to assert its own governmental authority. 49 The Court has
shown an increasing disregard in certain instances for explicit con-
41. See Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 111-12 (1959) (citing McGrain v.
Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 160 (1927)).
42. 198 U.S. 45, 56 (1905).
43. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 166 (1996) (Souter, J., dissent-
ing) (describing Lochner as a "nadir"); David E. Bernstein, Lochner's Legacy's
Legacy, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1 (2003); Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review,
91 MICH. L. REV. 577,623-24 (1993); Richard A. Primus, Canon, Anti-Canon, and
Judicial Dissent, 48 DuKE L.J. 243, 244 (1998); Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Leg-
acy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 874 (1987).
44. See Friedman, supra note 43, at 623 n.228.
45. 425 U.S. 463 (1976).
46. See, e.g., Inyo County v. Paiute-Shoshone Indians, 538 U.S. 701, 704 (2003); Ne-
vada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 364 (2001); Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S.
645, 659 (2001); Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 453 (1997); Montana v.
United States, 450 U.S. 544, 555-57 (1981).
47. See, e.g., Alaska v. Native Vill. of Venetie Tribal Gov't, 522 U.S. 520, 526-27
(1998); South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329, 351 (1998); Hagen v.
Utah, 510 U.S. 399, 421-22 (1994).
48. See, e.g., Hicks, 533 U.S. at 361-62; South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679,
690-91 (1993); County of Yakima v. Confed. Tribes & Bands of the Yakima In-
dian Nation, 502 U.S. 251 (1992); Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi
Indian Tribe of Okla., 498 U.S. 505, 513-14 (1991); Cotton Petrol. Corp. v. New
Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 186-87 (1989); Washington v. Confed. Tribes of the Colville
Indian Reserv'n, 447 U.S. 134, 159-62 (1980); Moe v. Confed. Salish & Kootenai
Tribes of the Flathead Reserv'n, 425 U.S. 463, 483 (1976).
49. City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 125 S. Ct. 1478 (2005).
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gressional statements of federal Indian policy. 50 This is a strange de-
velopment considering that until the mid-1970s, the Supreme Court
often stated that congressional legislation and Executive Branch dis-
cretionary decisionmaking relating to Indian affairs were nonjusticia-
ble political questions.51 Congress and the Executive continue to
make policy decisions in Indian affairs that apply to these cases,5 2 al-
though not the broad policy shifts made during the Roosevelt, 5 3 Eisen-
hower, 5 4 and Nixon Administrations. 55 Despite this, the Court has
plenty of relevant federal Indian policy guidance to follow.
The reason why federal courts have stepped into the intervention-
ist role as policymaker is likely the overlooked debate over a missing
constitutional source of authority for Congress and the President to
make federal Indian legislation and policy in the first instance. 56 This
50. See infra Part III.
51. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 215 (1962); Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Seber, 318
U.S. 705, 718 (1943); United States v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R., 314 U.S. 339, 347
(1941); Johnson v. Gearlds, 234 U.S. 422, 447 (1914); United States v. Sandoval,
231 U.S. 28, 46-47 (1913); United States v. Rickert, 188 U.S. 432, 445 (1903);
Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 568 (1903); United States v. Holliday, 70
U.S. 407, 419 (1865); United States v. Gemmill, 535 F.2d 1145, 1147 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 982 (1976); Norvell v. Sangre de Christo Dev. Co., 519 F.2d
370, 378-79 (10th Cir. 1975); cf. United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 518
F.2d 1298, 1300-01 (Ct. Cl.) (noting that "moral" claims brought in the Indian
Claims Commission were nonjusticiable), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1016 (1975).
52. See infra Part II.
53. See CLINTON, GOLDBERG & TSOSIE, supra note 5, at 36-37 (discussing the broad
policy changes of 1934's Indian Reorganization Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (2000),
under the Roosevelt Administration).
54. See WILKINSON, supra note 4, at 65-75 (noting the Eisenhower Administration's
actions leading to the passages of House Concurrent Resolution 108, the official
statement of the Termination Era).
55. See CLINTON, GOLDBERG & TsOSIE, supra note 5, at 43 (discussing President
Nixon's message to Congress announcing his support for tribal self-
determination).
56. Compare United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200 (2004) (holding that Congress
has "plenary and exclusive" powers "to legislate in respect to Indian tribes"), Rob-
ert Laurence, Learning to Live with the Plenary Power of Congress over the In-
dian Nations: An Essay in Reaction to Professor William's Algebra, 30 ARiz. L.
REV. 413 (1988), Robert Laurence, On Eurocentric Myopia, the Designated Hitter
Rule, and "The Actual State of Things," 30 ARIz. L. REV. 459 (1988), and Alex
Tallchief Skibine, Integrating the Indian Trust Doctrine into the Constitution, 39
TULSA L. REV. 247, 248-49 (2003) (arguing that plenary power and the trust doc-
trine are interrelated "in a positive way"), with Lara, 541 U.S. at 224 (Thomas, J.,
concurring) ("The Court utterly fails to find any provision of the Constitution that
gives Congress enumerated power to alter tribal sovereignty."), Milner S. Ball,
Constitution, Court, Indian Tribes, 1987 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 1 (arguing that
Congress does not have plenary power to legislate in the field of Indian affairs),
Robert N. Clinton, There Is No Federal Supremacy Clause for Indian Tribes, 34
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 113 (2002) [hereinafter Clinton, There Is No Federal Supremacy
Clause] (same), Robert N. Clinton, Redressing the Legacy of Conquest: A Vision
Quest for a Decolonized Federal Indian Law, 46 ARK. L. REV. 77, 112 (1993) [here-
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debate has its roots in the Rehnquist Court's deep suspicion of con-
gressional and Executive authority,57 and its increasing focus on tex-
tual bases for exercises of federal power.58 The Rehnquist Court's
inafter Clinton, Redressing the Legacy of Conquest] (same), Robert N. Clinton,
Tribal Courts and the Federal Union, 26 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 841, 930 (1990)
[hereinafter Clinton, Tribal Courts and the Federal Union], Robert N. Clinton, 47
U. CHI. L. REV. 846, 859 (1980) (reviewing RUSSEL LAWRENCE BARSH & JAMES
YOUNGBLOOD HENDERSON, THE ROAD: INDIAN TRIBES AND POLITICAL LIBERTY
(1980)), Robert N. Clinton, Isolated in Their Own Country: A Defense of Federal
Protection of Indian Autonomy and Self-Government, 33 STAN. L. REV. 979,
996-1001 (1981), Richard B. Collins, Indian Consent to American Government, 31
ARIZ. L. REV. 365 (1989), Philip P. Frickey, Domesticating Federal Indian Law, 81
MINN. L. REV. 31, 35 (1996), Ralph W. Johnson, Fragile Gains: Two Centuries of
Canadian and United States Policy Toward Indians, 66 WASH. L. REV. 643,
714-15 (1991) (urging reversal of Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903)),
Steven Paul McSloy, Back to the Future: Native American Sovereignty in the 21st
Century, 20 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 217 (1993), Nell Jessup Newton, Fed-
eral Power Over Indians: Its Sources, Scope, and Limitations, 132 U. PA. L. REV.
195 (1984), Prakash, supra note 9, at 1105-15, Saikrishna Prakash, Our Three
Commerce Clauses and the Presumption of Intrasentence Uniformity, 55 ARK. L.
REV. 1149, 1168 (2003) (arguing that the Court never explained why the Indian
Commerce Clause confers congressional plenary power), Joseph William Singer,
Lone Wolf, Or How to Take Property by Calling It a "Mere Change in the Form of
Investment," 38 TULSA L. REV. 37 (2002) (criticizing congressional plenary power
as applied), Catherine T. Struve, Tribal Immunity and Tribal Courts, 36 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 137, 171-72 (2004) (noting that congressional plenary power was imposed
without tribal consent), Gloria Valencia-Weber, The Supreme Court's Indian Law
Decisions: Deviations from Constitutional Principles and the Crafting of Judicial
Smallpox Blankets, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 405, 452 (2003), Kevin K. Washburn,
Lara, Lawrence, Supreme Court Litigation, and Lessons from Social Movements,
40 TULSA L. REV. 25, 42-43 (2004) (identifying the problem of a lack of textual
support for congressional plenary power), Robert A. Williams, Jr., Learning Not
to Live with Eurocentric Myopia: A Reply to Professor Laurence's Learning to Live
With the Plenary Power of Congress Over the Indian Nations, 30 ARIZ. L. REV.
439 (1988), Robert A. Williams, Jr., The Algebra of Federal Indian Law: The
Hard Trail of Decolonizing and Americanizing the White Man's Indian Jurispru-
dence, 1986 Wis. L. REV. 219 [hereinafter Williams, The Algebra of Federal In-
dian Law], and Note, International Law as an Interpretive Force in Federal
Indian Law, supra note 36, at 1755 n.26 (arguing that the Court tends to ignore
the source of congressional plenary power). See generally Sarah H. Cleveland,
Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories, and the Nineteenth
Century Origins of Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1, 80-81
(2002) (describing as "uncertain" whether the Court will continue to validate con-
gressional plenary power); Frank Pommersheim, Lara: A Constitutional Crisis in
Indian Law?, 28 Am. INDIAN L. REV. 299 (2004); Frank Pommersheim, Is There a
(Little or Not So Little) Constitutional Crisis Developing in Indian Law?, 5 U. PA.
J. CONST. L. 271 (2003).
57. See Herman Schwartz, The States' Rights Assault on Federal Authority, in THE
REHNQUIST COURT: JUDICIAL ACTIVISM ON THE RIGHT 155, 156-60 (Herman
Schwartz ed., 2002).
58. See Kneedler, supra note 5, at 278 ("First, this is a very text-oriented Supreme
Court. It likes to decide cases on the basis of the language of the statute or the
language of a treaty, rather than general principles."). But see Schwartz, supra
note 57, at 159 (discussing New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992), as a
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"states' rights" jurisprudence has also impacted the outcome of its In-
dian cases. 59
Without a clear textual source of authority in the Constitution for
Congress or the Executive to make federal Indian policy, the Court is
not constrained from entering into the realm of federal Indian poli-
cymaking, 6 0 despite the fact that the Judiciary has "an even more in-
ferior constitutional pedigree than Congress has."61 For example, in
other areas the Court is usually mindful, respectful, and pragmatic in
separation-of-powers questions.6 2 But Indian tribes are "extraconsti-
tutional"6 3- they did not engage in the debates over the Constitution;
they did not execute the Constitution; they were not included in the
federal system at all. 6 4 Chief Justice Marshall's strained solution to
case where the Court could not "rely on any provision in the Constitution, so this
time they used their own new conception of the constitutional 'framework' and
'structure'").
59. See Getches, Beyond Indian Law, supra note 27, at 344-45; Skibine, supra note
36, at 27; see also Evan H. Caminker, Judicial Solicitude for State Dignity, 574
ANNALS 81 (2001) (discussing the Supreme Court's concern with the 'dignitary
interests' of states in its sovereign-immunity jurisprudence); Evan H. Caminker,
State Sovereignty and Subordinancy: May Congress Commandeer State Officers
to Implement Federal Law?, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1001 (1995) (addressing problems
with the Supreme Court's "anti-commandeering doctrine" as set out in New York
v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992)); cf. generally Judith V. Royster, A Primer
on Indian Water Rights: More Questions Than Answers, 30 TULSA L.J. 61 (1994)
(noting that tribal water rights cases necessarily bump up against states' water
rights); cf. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 224 (2004) (Thomas, J., concur-
ring) (noting that he would be willing to revisit Indian Commerce Clause cases
and citing United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), and United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995)).
60. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Law as Equilibrium, 108 HAv.
L. REV. 26, 29 (1994) ("The most interesting public law issues, however, tend to be
those in which technological, social, or economic changes have rendered an equi-
librium unstable, or at least susceptible to movement. At that point, one of the
institutions of government, often the Court, will in fact successfully shift public
policy to render it more reflective of its own preferences.").
61. Frickey, (Native) American Exceptionalism, supra note 27, at 436.
62. See David C. Vladeck & Alan B. Morrison, The Roles, Rights, and Responsibilities
of the Executive Branch, in THE REHNQUIST COURT, supra note 57, at 170, 176.
63. Lara, 541 U.S. at 213 (Kennedy, J., concurring); DAVID E. WILKIS, AMERICAN
INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY AND THE U.S. SUPREME COURT: THE MASKING OF JUSTICE 21
(1997); CHARLES F. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME, AND THE LAW 112 (1987)
("Our jurisprudence, then, has recognized tribal authority as being both precon-
stitutional and extraconstitutional."); Frickey, supra note 30, at 1156 ("[Tlribal
sovereignty is inherent and 'pre-constitutional'...."); cf. Frickey, (Native) Ameri-
can Exceptionalism, supra note 27, at 464-65 ("In the last three decades, the
Court has also been exercising an extraconstitutional power over Indian
affairs . . ").
64. See United States v. Gregg, No. CR 04-30068, 2005 WL 1806345, at *1 (D.S.D.
July 27, 2005) ("Indian tribes, unlike the original states, had no connection with
and no involvement in the drafting and the adoption of the United States Consti-
tution. They had no connection with the give and take which resulted in the
adoption of the United States Constitution and the Bill of Rights."); Clinton,
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this problem was to label Indian tribes "domestic dependent nations"
as a matter of federal common law. 65 It appears that to the Court, the
constitutional rights, powers, duties, and responsibilities of Indian
tribes in "Our Federalism" 6 6 are questions that the Court began to
wrestle with in 1810.67 If nothing in the Constitution says otherwise,
then perhaps for the Court, federal Indian law is a problem for the
Judiciary. This leads to what Professor Frickey calls a "ruthless prag-
matism inconsistent with even the modest respect for tribal preroga-
tives that traditional federal Indian law sometimes reflected in
appreciation of our colonial past."68
A. Sources of Federal Indian Policy
The utterly inconsistent and fluctuating history of federal tribal
legal affairs is well documented. 6 9 Federal policy toward Indian tribes
has moved in various decades from physical extirpation 7 0 to measured
There Is No Federal Supremacy Clause, supra note 56, at 160; Richard A. Mo-
nette, A New Federalism for Indian Tribes: The Relationship Between the United
States and Tribes in Light of Our Federalism and Republican Democracy, 25 U.
TOL. L. REV. 617, 646-48 (1994); Prakash, supra note 9, at 1107; Charles F. Wil-
kinson, Civil Liberties Guarantees When Indian Tribes Act as Majority Societies:
The Case of the Winnebago Retrocession, 21 CREIGHTON L. REV. 773, 774-75
(1998); cf. Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 384 (1896) ("[Tlhe powers of local self
government enjoyed by the Cherokee nation existed prior to the Constitu-
tion . . . ."); see generally Robert N. Clinton, The Dormant Indian Commerce
Clause, 27 CONN. L. REV. 1055 (1995) [hereinafter Clinton, The Dormant Indian
Commerce Clause].
65. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17 (1831). Cf. generally Babcock, supra
note 36; Sarah Krakoff, A Narrative of Sovereignty: Illuminating the Paradox of
the Domestic Dependent Nation, 83 OR. L. REV. 1109 (2004).
66. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971); Texas v. Florida, 306 U.S. 398, 428
(1939) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
67. See Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87, 121, 142-43 (1810); id. at 145-47 (Johnson, J.,
concurring).
68. Frickey, (Native) American Exceptionalism, supra note 27, at 436. See also id. at
460 ("The Court has become colonialism's handyman, jerry-rigging a ruthlessly
pragmatic blend of federal Indian law with general American law.").
69. See WILLIAM C. CANBY, AMERICAN INDIAN LAw IN A NUTSHELL 11-33 (4th ed.
2004); CLINTON, GOLDBERG & TSOSIE, supra note 5, at 18-49; FELIX S. COHEN,
COHENrS HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW: 2005 EDITION §§ 1.02-.07 (Nell Jes-
sup Newton et al. eds., 2005) [hereinafter COHEN'S HANDBOOK 2005 ED.]; Vine
Deloria, Jr., "Congress in its Wisdom": The Course of Indian Legislation, in THE
AGGRESSIONS OF CIVILIZATION, supra note 9, at 105; Laurence M. Hauptman, The
Indian Reorganization Act, in THE AGGRESSIONS OF CIVILIZATION, supra note 9, at
131; Wilcomb E. Washburn, Indian Policy Since the 1880s, in THE AGGRESSIONS
OF CIVILIZATION, supra note 9, at 45.
70. See G. William Rice, Of Cold Steel and Blueprints: Musings of an Old Country
Lawyer on Crime, Jurisprudence, and the Tribal Attorney's Role in Developing
Tribal Sovereignty, KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y, Winter 1997, at 31, 44 (quoting MR.
JUSTICE JOSEPH STORY, A FAMILIAR EXPOSITION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
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separatism 7 1 to removal72 to assimilation 7 3 to self-determination 74-
sometimes at the same time.7 5
UNITED STATES 13-14 (1840)); cf. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 550 (1832)
(quoting Treaty of Fort Pitt art. VI, U.S.-Del. Indians, Sept. 17, 1778, 7 Stat. 13).
71. See WILKINSON, supra note 63, at 14-19; Raymond Cross, Sovereign Bargains,
Indian Takings, and the Preservation of Indian Country in the Twenty-First Cen-
tury, 40 ARiz. L. REV. 425, 458-64 (1998); Frank Pommersheim, Liberation,
Dreams, and Hard Work: An Essay on Tribal Court Jurisprudence, 1992 Wis. L.
REV. 411, 415; see also 25 U.S.C. § 177 (2000); WILKINSON, supra note 63, at 164
n.34 (discussing Trade and Intercourse Acts).
72. See City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y., 125 S. Ct. 1478, 1485 (2005);
United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 202 (2004); Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of
Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 191-92 (1999); United States v. John, 437 U.S.
634, 639 n.6 (1978); Cross, supra note 71, at 441-42; Donald E. Laverdure, A
Historical Braid of Inequality: An Indigenous Perspective of Brown v. Board of
Education, 43 WASHBURN L.J. 285, 302-03 (2004); Richard White, How Andrew
Jackson Saved the Cherokees, 5 GREEN BAG 2D 443, 443 (2002) (reviewing ROBERT
V. REMINI, ANDREW JACKSON AND His INDIAN WARS (2001)).
73. See Cass County v. Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians, 524 U.S. 103, 106-07
(1998); South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329, 339-40 (1998); Ha-
gen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399, 424-25 & n.4 (1994); County of Yakima v. Confed.
Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251, 253-54 (1992); Cot-
ton Petrol. Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 199-200 (1989) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting); Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reserv'n v. Wold Eng'g,
476 U.S. 877, 892 (1986); John, 437 U.S. at 653 n.24; Bryan v. Itasca County, 426
U.S. 373, 388-89 (1976); N. Cheyenne Tribe v. Hollowbreast, 425 U.S. 649, 650
n.1 (1976); Organized Vill. of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60, 74 (1962); Bd. of County
Comm'rs v. Seber, 318 U.S. 705, 716 (1943); Robert B. Porter, Strengthening Tri-
bal Sovereignty Through Peacemaking: How the Anglo-American Legal Tradition
Destroys Indigenous Societies, 28 COLUM. Hum. RTS. L. REV. 235, 269 (1997);
Judith V. Royster, The Legacy ofAllotment, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 7-9 (1995); Re-
becca Tsosie, The Challenge of "Differentiated Citizenship": Can State Constitu-
tions Protect Tribal Rights?, 64 MONT. L. REV. 199, 204-05 (2003); Richard A.
Monette, Comment, Indian Country Jurisdiction and the Assimilative Crimes
Act, 69 OR. L. REV. 269, 281, 293-94 (1990).
74. See Cherokee Nation of Okla. v. Leavitt, 125 S. Ct. 1172, 1176 (2005); County of
Yakima, 502 U.S. at 274 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part); California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 216 & n.19
(1987) (citing New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 334-35 &
n.17 (1983)); Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 14 & n.5 (1987); Nat'l
Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 856 (1985);
Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd., Inc. v. Bureau of Revenue of N.M., 458 U.S. 832, 840
(1982); White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 143 & n.10 (1980)
(citing Michael Gross, Indian Self-Determination and Tribal Sovereignty: An
Analysis of Recent Federal Policy, 56 TEX. L. REV. 1195 (1978)); Santa Clara
Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 62 & n.ll (1978); Raymond Cross, Tribes as Rich
Nations, 79 OR. L. REV. 893, 920-23 (2000); Rebecca Tsosie, Tribal Environmen-
tal Policy in an Era of Self-Determination: The Role of Ethics, Economics, and
Traditional Ecological Knowledge, 21 VT. L. REV. 225, 230-32 (1996); see gener-
ally Cross, supra note 9; Alex Tallchief Skibine, Reconciling Federal and State
Power Inside Indian Reservations with the Right of Tribal Self-Government and
the Process of Self-Determination, 1995 UTAH L. REV. 1105.
75. See generally Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 709 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
("This country has pursued contradictory policies with respect to the Indians.").
FEDERAL INDIAN POLICY
As a matter of federal constitutional law, the Indian Commerce
Clause grants Congress the only explicit constitutional authority to
deal with Indian tribes.76 Congress has legislated on the subject of
Indian affairs from the very beginning, starting with the Trade and
Intercourse Acts. 7 7 It is Congress that decides the overall federal pol-
icy of the United States-and as the popularly elected legislative body,
that is the way it should be.
The President and the Executive Branch also retain some poli-
cymaking duties regarding Indian affairs. Until 1871, the President
retained authority to enter into treaties with Indian tribes.7 8 With
that authority, the President helped to drive federal Indian policy for
decades. 79 Congress's termination of the President's authority to
make treaties with Indian tribes eviscerated much of the President's
constitutional power to make affirmative federal Indian policy. Con-
gress, however, has delegated much of its authority to make federal
Indian policy to the Executive,8 0 namely through the Bureau of Indian
Affairs (BIA)81 and other federal agencies, including the Indian
Health Service8 2 and the National Indian Gaming Commission.8 3
76. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; Lara, 541 U.S. at 200; Prakash, supra note 9, at
1087-90.
77. See FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 69-70 (1941) [hereinaf-
ter COHEN'S HANDBOOK 1ST ED.] (discussing first Trade and Intercourse Acts (cit-
ing Act of July 22, 1790, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 137; Act of Mar. 1, 1793, 1 Stat. 329; Act of
May 19, 1796, 1 Stat. 469)).
78. See Lara, 541 U.S. at 201; COHEN'S HANDBOOK 1ST ED., supra note 77, at 77 (cit-
ing Appropriation Act of Mar. 3, 1871, 16 Stat. 544, 566 (codified as amended at
25 U.S.C. § 71 (1988))); Wilkins, supra note 27, at 12.
79. See Mary Christina Wood, Fulfilling the Executive's Trust Responsibility Toward
the Native Nations on Environmental Issues: A Partial Critique of the Clinton
Administration's Promises and Performance, 25 ENVTL. L. 733, 738 (1995) ("At
the time of the Revolutionary War, the native nations and the United States es-
tablished mutual relations on a government-to-government level through trea-
ties. Because the Constitution places treaty-making power in the President, the
executive branch dominated Indian affairs." (footnote omitted)); see generally An-
drea M. Seielstad, The Recognition and Evolution of Tribal Sovereign Immunity
Under Federal Law: Legal, Historical, and Normative Reflections on a Funda-
mental Aspect of American Indian Sovereignty, 37 TULSA L. REV. 661, 684-85
(2002).
80. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 2, 9 (2000).
81. See id. § 2 (Commissioner of Indian Affairs); see generally Morton v. Mancari, 417
U.S. 535 (1974); Robert J. McCarthy, The Bureau of Indian Affairs and the Fed-
eral Trust Obligation to American Indians, 19 BYU J. Pus. L. 1 (2004).
82. See Indian Health Care Improvement Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1680o (2000); see
generally Rose L. Pfefferbaum et al., Providing for the Health Care Needs of Na-
tive Americans: Policy, Programs, Procedures, and Practices, 21 AM. INDIAN L.
REV. 211 (1997).
83. See 25 U.S.C. § 2704 (2000); LIGHT & RAND, INDIAN GAMING AND TRIBAL SOVER-
EIGNrv, supra note 2; Washburn, Recurring Problems in Indian Gaming, supra
note 2, at 431-33; Brian P. McClatchey, Note, A Whole New Game: Recognizing
the Changing Complexion of Indian Gaming by Removing the "Governor's Veto"
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Through the promulgation of federal regulations8 4 and the making of
informal policy,85 these federal agencies have extensive federal Indian
policymaking capabilities.
The third branch-the Federal Judiciary-has wavered through-
out the history of the Federal Constitution, uncertain of its place in
federal Indian policy. From the time of the Marshall Court to the mid-
1880s, the Supreme Court maintained a federal common law that em-
phasized a wide divide between federal law and policy, and the inter-
nal sovereign affairs of Indian tribes. In Worcester v. Georgia,8 6 the
Court drew a bright line separating state law from Indian Country,
allowing tribes to govern themselves without interference.87 In two
critical state taxation cases, In re Kansas Indians8 and In re New
York Indians,8 9 the Court held that states have no power to tax Indian
trust lands. 90 In Elk v. Wilkins,91 the Court held that the Fourteenth
Amendment did not apply to Indians, relying on the fact that, while
tribes were not foreign nations, they were not entirely included in the
American constitutional scheme. 92 The Court held in Ex parte Crow
for Gaming on "After-Acquired" Lands, 37 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1227, 1247
(2004).
84. E.g., National Indian Gaming Commission Regulations, 25 C.F.R. pt. 501 (2005);
Contracts Under the Indian Education and Self-Determination Act, 25 C.F.R. pt.
900 (2005).
85. See, e.g., Ann C. Juliano, Conflicted Justice: The Department of Justice's Conflict
of Interest in Representing Native American Tribes, 37 GA. L. REV. 1307, 1339-40
(2003) (discussing the Department of Justice's informal position on representing
Indian tribes in land-claims cases); Letter from James Cason, Assistant Deputy
Sec'y, Dep't of the Interior, to Theodore R. Kulongoski, Governor, State of Or.
(May 20, 2005) (on file with author), available at http://www.schlosserlawfiles.
com/Warm%20Springs%2OLtr.pdf (disapproving gaming compact between the
State of Oregon and the Confederated Tribes of the Warm Springs Reservation of
Oregon); Letter from Gale A. Norton, Sec'y, Dep't of the Interior, to Honorable
Cyrus Schindler, Nation President, Seneca Nation of Indians (Nov. 12, 2002) (ap-
proving gaming compact allowing off-reservation gaming "reluctantly" and with
"extreme[ ] concern[ ]"), quoted in Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Sawnawgezewog: "The
Indian Problem"and the Lost Art of Survival, 28 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 35, 86 n.259
(2003).
86. 31 U.S. 515 (1832).
87. See id. at 520 ("The Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community, occupying its
own territory, with boundaries accurately described, in which the laws of Georgia
can have no force, and which the citizens of Georgia have no right to enter, but
with the assent of the Cherokees themselves, or in conformity with treaties, and
with the acts of [Clongress."); Philip P. Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present:
Colonialism, Constitutionalism, and Interpretation in Federal Indian Law, 107
HARv. L. REV. 381, 393-406 (1993) (discussing Worcester).
88. 72 U.S. 737 (1866).
89. 72 U.S. 761 (1866).
90. Id. at 771-72; In re Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. at 759-60 (declining taxation of the
Shawnee, Wea, and Miami lands).
91. 112 U.S. 94 (1884).
92. See id. at 99.
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Dog9 3 that the federal government had no authority to prosecute Indi-
ans who murder other Indians on reservation lands when the accused
had already been prosecuted in accordance with tribal law. While the
Court of the nineteenth century acknowledged, as a matter of federal
common law, that Indian tribes lost their external sovereignty by the
mere presence of the United States,9 4 the Court did not see a constitu-
tional basis for the intervention of American policy or American law
into the separate and internal affairs of Indian tribes.95
From the mid-1880s, however, until the latter half of the Burger
Court years, as Congress and the Executive intervened more into the
internal affairs of Indian tribes-breaking down the wall that sepa-
rated the federal government from the inner workings of tribal gov-
ernment and society-the Court completely stepped out of the picture.
In Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock,9 6 the Court recognized as a matter of fed-
eral common law that Congress possessed unprecedented plenary and
exclusive power over Indian affairs,9 7 while at the same time adopting
the position that congressional decisions on Indian affairs were non-
justiciable political questions.9 8 The Court adopted a stance for al-
93. 109 U.S. 556, 572 (1883) (citing United States v. Joseph, 94 U.S. 614, 617 (1876)).
Although Elk came after Crow Dog, it was the Court's decision in Crow Dog that
federal Indian agents used to drum up a political frenzy resulting in the imposi-
tion of federal criminal law into Indian Country through the Major Crimes Act of
1885, 23 Stat. 385 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2000)). See CLINTON,
GOLDBERG & TSOSIE, supra note 5, at 101-02; see generally SIDNEY L. HARRING,
CROW DOG'S CASE: AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY, TRIBAL LAW, AND UNITED
STATES LAW IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY (Frederick Hoxie & Neal Salisbury
eds., 1994).
94. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 (1831); Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S.
543 (1823); see also Brendale v. Confed. Tribes & Bands of Yakima Indian Nation,
492 U.S. 408, 453 (1989) (Blackmun, J., concurring and dissenting) (expressing
the view that splitting tribal zoning authority is inconsistent with the Court's
past decisions of inherent sovereignty).
95. See United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 378-79 (1886) (noting that the In-
dian Commerce Clause does not explicitly confer upon Congress the authority to
enact criminal laws in Indian Country). But see id. at 383-84 (finding congres-
sional authority in the "state of pupilage" in which the Court found Indians re-
sided); id. at 384-85 ("It must exist in that government, because it never has
existed anywhere else; because the theater of its exercise is within the geographi-
cal limits of the United States; because it has never been denied; and because it
alone can enforce its laws on all the tribes.").
96. 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
97. See id. at 565 (noting that Congress has "[p]lenary authority over the tribal rela-
tions of the Indians").
98. See id. at 568 (citing Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 294 (1902)). Lone
Wolf tested the authority of Congress to abrogate an Indian treaty. See id. at 566.
In twisted irony, the Court asserted two restrictions on congressional plenary
power, but refused to enforce either. First, Congress should only act in a "contin-
gency" or an emergency related to Indian lands. See id. Second, Congress's
power depends on its ability to act "in perfect good faith." Id. The plaintiffs in
Lone Wolf had asserted that federal agents had committed fraud and that no
20061
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
most a century that federal Indian policy choices were political
questions with which it would not interfere. 99
Until recently, the states have had a very limited role in the mak-
ing of federal Indian policy. The Court retained its stance in Worcester
through Justice Black's opinion in Williams v. Lee,lOO which denied
state court jurisdiction over a civil claim brought against an Indian
over events occurring in Indian Country. O1 Yet, as we shall see, from
the appointment of then-Justice Rehnquist to the present day, the
Court more frequently and powerfully invoked the interests of state
governments and non-Indian citizens in its Indian cases.10 2
B. Modern Congressional Statements of Federal Indian
Policy
Most watchers of Indian affairs agree that federal Indian policy is
now within the era of self-determination for Indian tribes, an era that
began in the 1960s and early 1970s.10 3 Congress has legislated in nu-
merous areas relating to Indian affairs since the mid-1970s, often
stating a federal policy promoting the self-determination of Indian
tribes. Congressional and Executive Branch commitment to the fed-
eral policy of tribal self-determination has, for some commentators,
strengthened or wavered, prompting commentators to suggest that we
have entered new eras of federal Indian policy-government-to-gov-
particular emergency existed, see id. at 556, 558, 561, strong evidence that Con-
gress, and the federal government overall, had not acted in good faith in the mat-
ter. Despite this, the Court concluded that a lack of good faith was irrelevant
because it would treat allegations of fraud as nonjusticiable political questions.
See id. at 568 ("In any event, as Congress possessed full power in the matter, the
judiciary cannot question or inquire into the motives which prompted the enact-
ment of this legislation. If injury was occasioned, which we do not wish to be
understood as implying, by the use made by Congress of its power, relief must be
sought by an appeal to that body for redress, and not to the courts."). One federaljudge called Lone Wolf"the Indians' Dred Scott decision." Sioux Nation v. United
States, 601 F.2d 1157, 1173 (Ct. Cl. 1979) (Nichols, J., concurring), affd, 448 U.S.
371 (1980).
99. See supra Part II.
100. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
101. See id. at 220-21, 223.
102. See generally Getches, Beyond Indian Law, supra note 27; Skibine, supra note 36.
103. See CLINTON, GOLDBERG & TsosIE, supra note 5, at 41 ("President Kennedy prom-
ised the Indians that '[tihere would be no change in treaty or contractual rela-
tionships without the consent of the tribes concerned. .. . "); D'ARcY McNICKLE,
NATIVE AMERICAN TRIBALISM: INDIAN SURVIVALS AND RENEWALS 124 (rev. ed.
1973) ("We must affirm their rights to freedom of choice and self-determination."
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Lyndon B. Johnson, President, U.S.,
Message to Congress (Mar. 6, 1968))); see generally COHEN'S HANDBOOK 2005 ED.,
supra note 69, § 1.07; WILKINSON, supra note 4, at 189, 257.
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ernment relations' 0 4 or self-reliance.10 5 Regardless, the explicit legis-
lative policy remains self-determination.
1. Self-Gouernance
The various self-determination acts include the Indian Self-Deter-
mination and Education Assistance Act lo 6 and the Native American
Housing Assistance and Self-Determination Act.107 These Acts imple-
ment a federal tribal relationship first proposed by Interior Secretary
Collier during the debates leading up to the Indian Reorganization Act
of 1934.108 Up to this time, the federal government relied exclusively
on the BIA to superintend Indian reservations.1 0 9 The federal govern-
ment funded the agency, and the agency ran the reservations. In
some instances, local BIA superintendents were tyrannical in the
ways they governed Indian reservations. 1 10
By the Depression, the long-standing federal Indian policy was
that Indians and Indian tribes were in a state of pupilage.111 The fed-
eral government treated tribes as if they needed training in American
104. CLINTON, GOLDBERG & TSOSIE, supra note 5, at 45-48.
105. See Colman McCarthy, Congress Kicking Indians While They're Down, GRAND
RAPIDS PRESS (Mich.), Sept. 22, 1995 ("Another argument heard in the House and
Senate to justify the budgetary hacking is that Indians, along with others on wel-
fare, need to acquire self-reliance. It's forgotten that social programs for Indians
are matters of justice, not charity, largesse or the dole."), quoted in Fletcher,
supra note 85, at 43 n.40.
106. Pub. L. No. 93-638, 88 Stat. 2203 (1975) (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 450-458bbb-2
(2000)).
107. Pub. L. No. 104-330, 110 Stat. 4017 (1996) (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 4101-4243
(2000)).
108. See H.R. 7902, 73d Cong., tit. I, § 4(i) (2d Sess. 1934) (authorizing Indian tribes
"[t]o exercise any other powers now or hereafter delegated to the Office of Indian
Affairs, or any officials thereof... and to act in general as an Federal agency in
the administration of Indian Affairs"), reprinted in VINE DELORIA, JR., THE IN-
DIAN REORGANIZATION ACT: CONGRESSES AND BILLS 10 (2002).
109. See generally COHEN'S HANDBOOK 1ST ED., supra note 77, at 9-32; James E. Of-
ficer, The Indian Service and Its Evolution, in THE AGGRESSIONS OF CIVILIZATION,
supra note 9, at 59-71.
110. See, e.g., Allison M. Dussias, Waging War With Words: Native Americans' Contin-
uing Struggle Against the Suppression of Their Languages, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 901,
905-28 (1999) (identifying boarding school and language abuses); Allison M. Dus-
sias, Ghost Dance and Holy Ghost: The Echoes of Nineteenth-Century Christiani-
zation Policy in Twentieth-Century Native American Free Exercise Cases, 49 STAN
L. REV. 773, 776-805 (1997) (identifying religious abuses); cf generally Felix S.
Cohen, The Erosion of Indian Rights, 1950-1953: A Case Study in Bureaucracy,
62 YALE L.J. 348, 348, 374-86 (1953) (alleging abuses by the Bureau of Indian
Affairs in the early 1950s).
111. See Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 294, 305 (1902); Elk v. Wilkins, 112
U.S. 94, 106-07 (1884); United States v. Holliday, 70 U.S. 407, 415-16 (1866);
Fellows v. Blacksmith, 60 U.S. 366, 371 (1856); Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S.
393, 404 (1856); COHEN'S HANDBOOK 1ST ED., supra note 77, at 40-43 (discussing
the "dependence" of Indian tribes on the United States).
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ways to become civilized. The reservation, as one federal district court
judge stated in United States v. Clapox,112 was a sort of school, and
BIA superintendents were school masters. 1 13 Secretary Collier, work-
ing with his brilliant legal counsel, Interior Solicitor Nathan Margold
and Assistant Interior Solicitor Felix Cohen, proposed abandoning the
BIA and allowing the tribes to govern their own reservations with fed-
eral assistance. 1 14 BIA employees, desperate to save their floundering
bureaucracy, did what they could to undermine the proposal, arguing
at times that tribal governments had no capacity to take over federal
governmental functions.115 The proposal was dropped in the final ver-
sion of the IRA, replaced with the compromise provision offering pref-
erence to Indians in BIA employment.116
In the mid-1970s, however, with local control of government a hot
topic in federal circles, it was the perfect time to begin the process of
allowing Indian tribes to take over for the BIA. Congress ordered the
BIA and the Indian Health Service to enter into contracts, known as
"638-contracts" (named after the Public Law creating the mechanism),
whereby the tribes would take over certain federal programs at the
tribe's request. 1 17 For example, a tribe could make a request to the
BIA to enter into 638-contracts relating to the tribal courts, enroll-
ment, and child welfare functions.1 18 The BIA would have no choice
but to negotiate a form contract1 19 with the tribe and turn over a cer-
tain sum of federal dollars that would have been allocated to the BIA
to operate those functions, minus administrative costs, of course. A
few years later, Congress began to authorize Indian tribes to take over
the entire bevy of federal programs administered by the BIA.120
These tribes are known as self-governance tribes.121
112. 35 F. 575 (D. Or. 1888).
113. See id. at 579 ("[T]he act with which these defendants are charged [helping a
prisoner convicted of adultery escape] is in flagrant opposition to the authority of
the United States on this reservation, and directly subversive of this laudable
effort to accustom and educate these Indians in the habit and knowledge of self-
government. It is therefore appropriate and needful that the power and name of
the government of the United States should be invoked to restrain and punish
them.").
114. See supra note 108; Hauptman, supra note 69, at 135-36 (noting the role of Col-
lier, Margold, and Cohen).
115. See generally Officer, supra note 109, at 72-73.
116. See Hauptman, supra note 69, at 137.
117. See 25 U.S.C. § 450f(a) (2000).
118. See id.
119. See id. § 4501 (2000).
120. See Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act Amendments of
1988, Pub. L. No. 100-472, 102 Stat. 2285 (1988) (codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of 25 U.S.C.); see generally Tadd M. Johnson & James Hamilton,
Self-Governance for Indian Tribes: From Paternalism to Empowerment, 27 CONN.
L. REV. 1251 (1995).
121. See generally McCarthy, supra note 81, at 135-37.
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The import of these programs is that Congress has placed its sup-
port behind Indian tribal governments. Although the process of tak-
ing over federal functions by tribes has often been painful and
annoying, 12 2 congressional support of tribal self-governance is unwa-
vering. The clear federal policy in this area is to advance tribal self-
government. Congress's explicit declaration of policy incorporated into
the Self-Determination Act is as follows:
(b) Declaration of commitment
The Congress declares its commitment to ... the establishment of a mean-
ingful Indian self-determination policy which will permit an orderly transition
from the Federal domination of programs for, and services to, Indians .... In
accordance with this policy, the United States is committed to supporting and
assisting Indian tribes in the development of strong and stable tribal govern-
ments, capable of administering quality programs and developing the econo-
mies of their respective communities.1 2 3
Similarly, Congress's statement of policy in the Native American
Housing Assistance and Self-Determination Act provided:
The Congress finds that-
(6) the need for affordable homes in safe and healthy environments on In-
dian reservations, in Indian communities, and in Native Alaskan villages is
acute and the Federal Government should work not only to provide housing
assistance, but also, to the extent practicable, to assist in the development of
private housing finance mechanisms on Indian lands to achieve the goals of
economic self-sufficiency and self-determination for tribes and their members;
and
(7) Federal assistance to meet these responsibilities should be provided in
a manner that recognizes the right of Indian self-determination and tribal self-
governance by making such assistance available directly to the Indian tribes
or tribally designated entities under authorities similar to those accorded In-
dian tribes in Public Law 93-638 (25 U.S.C. 450 et seq.). 1 2 4
The self-determination acts fulfill much of the promise of the origi-
nal version of the Indian Reorganization Act that Commissioner Col-
lier proposed in the early 1930s and affirms the federal Indian policy
of self-determination and self-governance, an original purpose of the
IRA itself.125
122. See Hauptman, supra note 69, at 143; Porter, supra note 9, at 965.
123. 25 U.S.C. § 450a (2000) (emphasis added).
124. Id. § 4101 (emphasis added).
125. See Blackfeet Tribe of Indians v. Montana, 729 F.2d 1192, 1197 (9th Cir. 1984)
("Among the purposes of the IRA were the promotion of a significant increase in
tribal autonomy and authority and the extension to the tribes of 'an opportunity
to take over the control of their own resources.'" (quoting 78 CONG. REC. 11123,
11123-25 (1934) (statement of Sen. Wheeler), citing Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S.
535, 542 (1974); FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAw 147 (Ren-
nard Strickland et al. eds., 1982))), affd, 471 U.S. 759 (1985); Cheyenne River
Sioux Tribe v. Kleppe, 424 F. Supp. 448, 450 (D.S.D. 1977) ("The specific purpose
of the Indian Reorganization Act was to foster and encourage self-government by
the various Indian tribes." (citing Fisher v. Dist. Ct., 424 U.S. 382 (1976); Mes-
calero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 151 (1973))); see generally Timothy W.
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2. Economic Development, Tax Authority, and Immunities
Congressional policy is also strongly in favor of tribal economic de-
velopment. Congress is fully aware that few Indian tribes have a suf-
ficient tax revenue base to fund a necessary array of governmental
functions.126 In the enactment of the IRA, Congress and the Presi-
dent stated that one of the key purposes of that act was to encourage
tribal economic development.12 7 An Indian tribe with business opera-
tions sufficient to pay for its own administration, social services, edu-
cation, health care, housing, etc., reduces tribal member dependence
on the federal, state, and local safety net. Section 17 of the IRA al-
lowed Indian tribes to form economic development corporations under
federal law.128
Congress took a sharp turn away from tribal self-government and
economic self-sufficiency during the "Termination Era" of the 1950s
and 1960s. 129 Congress enacted laws terminating the federal supervi-
sion of hundreds of tribes and issued policy statements encouraging
Joranko & Mark C. Van Norman, Indian Self-Determination at Bay: Secretarial
Authority to Disapprove Trial Constitutional Amendments, 29 GONZ. L. REV. 81
(1993); Porter, supra note 73.
126. See S. REP. No. 105-95, at 18 (1997) ("This program will help local jurisdictions
maintain public roads that serve Indian reservations and are used by school
buses to transport children to or from school or a Headstart program. Such juris-
dictions, which comprise mostly Federal or tribal land, and may not do not [sic]
have sufficient tax bases to support the maintenance of roads on these Federal
lands."); S. REP. No. 102-158, at 5 (1991) ("Despite the progress made in recent
years among Indian tribes and individuals, most American Indians and other Na-
tive Americans continue to experience rates ofjoblessness far higher than other
Americans, owing, among other things, to an absence of employment opportuni-
ties. In locations often remote from population centers and usually lacking a tax
base, most tribal governments are handicapped in their efforts to stimulate local
economic development and, in some locations, to effectively carry out the basic
functions of government."); Matthew L.M. Fletcher, In Pursuit of Tribal Eco-
nomic Development as a Substitute for Reservation Tax Revenue, 80 N.D. L. REV.
759, 771-72 (2004).
127. See 25 U.S.C. § 470 (2000) (establishing revolving fund for economic development
loans to tribal corporations); id. § 477 (establishing authority for tribes to estab-
lish economic development corporations); Laurie Reynolds, Indian Hunting and
Fishing Rights: The Role of Tribal Sovereignty and Preemption, 62 N.C. L. REV.
743, 785-86 (1984) (citing S. REP. No. 73-1080, at 3-4 (1934)); Comment, Tribal
Self-Government and the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 70 MICH. L. REV.
955, 961 (1972) (citing H.R. 7902, 73d Cong. (2d Sess. 1934); S. 2755, 73d Cong.
(2d Sess. 1934)); cf. South Dakota v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 314 F. Supp. 2d 935,
942 (D.S.D. 2004) (agreeing that federal agency could take land into trust under
IRA provisions where action would improve tribal economic development oppor-
tunities), affd, 423 F.3d 790 (8th Cir. 2005), petition for cert. filed, 75 U.S.L.W.
3020 (U.S. May 8, 2006) (No. 05-1428).
128. 25 U.S.C. § 477 (2000).
129. See Charles F. Wilkinson & Eric R. Biggs, The Evolution of the Termination Pol-
icy, 5 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 139, 140 (1977).
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the BIA to wind down tribal operations on all reservations.130 Con-
gress then turned away from that mode and returned to the self-suffi-
ciency and economic development mode of the IRA.
Congress enacted numerous pieces of legislation since the 1970s to
encourage tribal economic development and ease tax burdens on In-
dian tribes.131 In each piece of legislation, Congress made findings of
fact and strong statements of support for tribal economic develop-
ment. For Congress, the long-term solution to tribal dependence on
federal programs lies in reservations with economic strength. 13 2 Con-
gress's recent commitment to encouraging tribal economic develop-
ment has been unwavering.
Congress's first piece of legislation designed to bolster tribal eco-
nomic development in the self-determination era was the Indian Fi-
nancing Act of 1974.133 Section 1 of the Act provides:
It is hereby declared to be the policy of Congress to provide capital on a
reimbursable basis to help develop and utilize Indian resources, both physical
and human, to a point where the Indians will fully exercise responsibility for
the utilization and management of their own resources and where they will
enjoy a standard of living from their own productive efforts comparable to that
enjoyed by non-Indians in neighboring communities.1 3 4
The House Report accompanying the Act made clear that Congress's
intent was to promote tribal economies through the development of
individual and tribal capital structures.13 5 The House Report elabo-
rated by noting, "On every reservation today, there is almost a total
lack of an economic community. If the long-sought goal of Indian self-
sufficiency is to be reached, such financial assistance must be pro-
130. See WILKINSON, supra note 4, at 71-81, 178-82 (identifying laws terminating fed-
eral provisions of the Menominee, Klamath, California, Oregon, and Colville
tribes); Cross, supra note 74, at 963-64 (discussing proposed termination of Fort
Berthold Reservation).
The termination policy was misguided and utterly disastrous for Indians and
Indian tribes. See WINONA LADuKE, RECOVERING THE SACRED: THE POWER OF
NAMING AND CLAIMING 52-55 (2005) (describing impacts at Kiamath); WILKINSON,
supra note 4, at 81-84 (documenting impacts at Klamath and Menominee); Wil-
kinson & Biggs, supra note 129, at 144.
131. See infra text accompanying notes 132-41.
132. See Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 152 (1973) ("The intent and
purpose of the Reorganization Act was 'to rehabilitate the Indian's economic life
and to give him a chance to develop the initiative destroyed by a century of op-
pression and paternalism.'" (quoting H.R. REP. No. 73-1804, at 6 (1934), citing S.
REP. No. 73-1080, at 1 (1934))); Seth H. Row, Student Research, Tribal Sover-
eignty and Economic Development on the Reservation, 4 GEO. J. ON FIGHTING POV-
ERTY 227, 227 (1996).
133. See Pub. L. No. 93-262, 88 Stat. 77 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1544 (2000)).
134. 25 U.S.C. § 1451 (2000).
135. See H.R. REP. No. 93-907, at 1 (1974), as reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2873,
2874 ("The purpose of the bill . . .is to provide Indian tribes and individuals
[with] capital in the form of loans and grants to promote economic and other
development.").
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vided or facilitated."13 6 In short, tribal economic development, accord-
ing to Congress, is critical to tribal self-sufficiency.
In 1982, Congress enacted the Indian Tribal Government Tax Sta-
tus Act, 1 37 further cementing its support for tribal economic develop-
ment efforts.138 In this Act, Congress extended many (but not all) of
the tax advantages enjoyed by state and local governments to Indian
tribal governments. 139 Congress intended the Act to "create the de-
velopment environment necessary for true economic and social self-
sufficiency."14o
In perhaps the strongest and most explicit statement in favor of
tribal economic development, Congress codified and validated Indian
gaming operations in the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA).141
Congress made an explicit statement of federal Indian policy strongly
136. Id. at 6-7, 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2874.
137. See Pub. L. No. 97-473, 96 Stat. 2607 (codified in part at 26 U.S.C. § 7871 (2000)).
138. See generally Robert A. Williams, Jr., Small Steps on the Long Road to Self-Suffi-
ciency for Indian Nations: The Indian Tribal Governmental Tax Status Act of
1982, 22 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 335 (1985).
139. See 26 U.S.C. § 7871 (2000).
140. See Williams, supra note 138, at 357 (citing 127 CONG. REC. 11132 (1982) (state-
ment of Sen. Wallop)).
141. See Pub. L. No. 100-497, 102 Stat. 2467 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721
(2000)); see also Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v.
United States, 367 F.3d 650, 654 (7th Cir. 2004) ("Congress passed IGRA for the
purpose of creating a federal regulatory scheme for the operation of gaming on
Indian lands." (citing 25 U.S.C. § 2702 (2000)).
As many courts and commentators have correctly noted, Congress enacted
IGRA in response to the Supreme Court's decision in California v. Cabazon Band
of Mission Indians of California, 480 U.S. 202 (1987). See Artichoke Joe's Cal.
Grand Casino v. Norton, 353 F.3d 712, 715 (9th Cir. 2003); Seneca-Cayuga Tribe
of Okla. v. Nat'l Indian Gaming Comm'n, 327 F.3d 1019, 1022-23 (10th Cir.
2003); Ysleta del Sur Pueblo v. Texas, 36 F.3d 1325, 1330 (5th Cir. 1994); Taxpay-
ers of Mich. Against Casinos v. State, 685 N.W.2d 221, 237 (Mich. 2004); Dalton
v. Pataki, 835 N.E.2d 1180, 1188 (N.Y. 2005); McClatchey, supra note 83, at
1242; Rand & Light, supra note 24, at 382; Alex Tallchief Skibine, Gaming on
Indian Reservations: Defining the Trustee's Duty in the Wake of Seminole Tribe v.
Florida, 29 ARiz. ST. L.J. 121, 129 (1997); Rebecca Tsosie, Negotiating Economic
Survival: The Consent Principle and Tribal-State Compacts Under the Indian
Gaming Regulatory Act, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 25, 49 (1997).
Some courts and commentators have asserted that a critical element of con-
gressional intent in passing IGRA was to slow or halt the spread (or proliferation)
of Indian gaming. See Ponca Tribe of Okla. v. Oklahoma, 37 F.3d 1422, 1425
(10th Cir. 1994), vacated, 517 U.S. 1129 (1996); Texas v. Ysleta del sur Pueblo,
220 F. Supp. 2d 668, 681 n.6 (W.D. Tex. 2001); Nicholas S. Goldin, Note, Casting
a New Light on Tribal Casino Gaming: Why Congress Should Curtail the Scope of
High Stakes Indian Gaming, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 798, 824 n.200 (1999). How-
ever, this view is the minority view and has not been upheld by a court of last
resort. See, e.g., Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa & Chippewa Indians v. U.S.
Att'y for the W. Dist. of Mich., 198 F. Supp. 2d 920, 933 (W.D. Mich. 2002) (re-
jecting State of Michigan's argument that the purpose of IGRA was to "limit the
proliferation of casinos"), affd, 369 F.3d 960 (6th Cir. 2004).
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favoring tribal economic development by stating that IGRA is in-
tended "to provide a statutory basis for the operation of gaming by
Indian tribes as a means of promoting tribal economic development,
self-sufficiency, and strong tribal governments."14 2
In short, explicit congressional statements of federal Indian policy,
as well as legislative history related to Indian affairs legislation,
strongly support the tribal economic development activities of Indian
tribes. This is critical given that the only textual support within the
Constitution for congressional authority is the Indian Commerce
Clause.143
3. Tribal Court Development
Part and parcel of tribal governance is tribal court development,
but the history of tribal court development is spotty. The first tribal
courts for many reservations were the old Courts of Indian Of-
fenses,144 later known as CFR Courts. 145 These courts are Article II
courts created by the Secretary of the Interior and run by the BIA to
regulate the reservation activities of Indians.146 The BIA enacted res-
ervation law-and-order codes as federal regulations for every activity
of reservation life from crimes to curfews to religious ceremonies. 147
142. 25 U.S.C. § 2702(1) (2000) (emphasis added). See Grand Traverse Band of Ot-
tawa & Chippewa Indians v. U.S. Att'y for the W. Dist. of Mich., 369 F.3d 960,
971 (6th Cir. 2004); City of Roseville v. Norton, 348 F.3d 1020, 1030 (D.C. Cir.
2003); Seneca-Cayuga Tribe, 327 F.3d at 1033; Am. Greyhound Racing, Inc. v.
Hull, 305 F.3d 1015, 1018 (9th Cir. 2002); Diamond Game Enters., Inc. v. Reno,
230 F.3d 365, 367-68 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
143. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; see also Angela R. Riley, Recovering Collectivity:
Group Rights to Intellectual Property in Indigenous Communities, 18 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 175, 205 (2000) (describing the Indian Commerce Clause as
"grant of singular authority to Congress to regulate intercourse and trade with
Indian tribes, the only minority group explicitly mentioned in the Constitution").
144. See Watt v. Colville Confed. Tribes, 25 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training
Program) 6027, 6028 (Colville Confed. Tribes Ct. App. 1998) (Stewart, J., concur-
ring) (describing the history of the Colville tribal courts); Vine Deloria, Jr. & Clif-
ford M. Lytle, Courts of Indian Offenses, in JUSTIN B. RICHLAND & SARAH DEER,
INTRODUCTION TO TRIBAL LEGAL STUDIES 76-77 (Jerry Gardner ed., 2004).
145. See Deloria & Lytle, supra note 144, at 78; Stacy L. Leeds, Cross-Jurisdictional
Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments: A Tribal Court Perspective, 76 N.D.
L. REV. 311, 353 n.259 (2000).
146. See, e.g., Muscogee (Creek) Nation v. Hodel, 851 F.2d 1439 (D.C. Cir. 1988);
United States v. Clapox, 35 F. 575 (D. Or. 1888); STEVEN L. PEVAR, THE RIGHTS OF
INDIANS AND TRIBES 103 (2002); Sarah Deer, Toward an Indigenous Jurispru-
dence of Rape, 14 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 121, 128 n.75 (2004); Gloria Valencia-
Weber, Tribal Courts: Custom and Innovative Law, 24 N.M. L. REV. 225, 233-35
(1994).
147. See Clapox, 35 F. at 578-79; Deloria & Lytle, supra note 144, at 78; Valencia-
Weber, supra note 146, at 235; cf. generally Cohen, supra note 110 (alleging that
the Bureau of Indian Affairs exercised complete, authoritarian control over many
reservations).
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BIA agents used the courts and the codes to stamp out traditional
ceremonies.148
Through the IRA, Congress made a strong statement in support of
tribal governments but ignored tribal courts.14 9 It is possible that
Congress was implicitly recognizing that Indian tribes, as a general
rule, did not resolve disputes using an adversarial court system in the
Anglo-American model.150 BIA officials and superintendents working
with tribes to develop written constitutions encouraged, and in some
cases coerced, tribes to adopt a model IRA constitution. 15 ' The model
IRA constitutions read similar to a municipal code, 152 not like a gov-
erning document useful for sovereign governments that pre-existed
the United States Constitution. The constitutions often did not pro-
vide for the establishment of tribal courts. 15 3 Where they did, they
did not provide for a separation of powers;154 typically, the constitu-
tion would authorize the tribal council to create the tribal court.155
Congress unwittingly gave a large boost to tribal courts by enact-
ing the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA).156 On one hand, the Act itself
is certainly a denigration of tribal sovereign authority, limiting the
powers of tribal governments,157 but the Act does not provide a federal
148. See Deloria & Lytle, supra note 144, at 78.
149. See Christine Zuni, Legal History of Tribal Courts, in INTRODUCTION TO TRIBAL
LEGAL STUDIES, supra note 144, at 78, 80-81.
150. See generally Ada Pecos Melton, Indigenous Justice Systems and Tribal Society,
in RICHLAND & DEER, supra note 144, at 314-320.
151. See Thorstenson v. Cudmore, 18 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training Pro-
gram) 6051, 6053 (Cheyenne River Sioux Ct. App. 1991); RUSSEL BARSH & JAMES
YOUNGBLOOD HENDERSON, THE ROAD: INDIAN TRIBES AND POLITICAL LIBERTY
96-111 (1980); Ralph W. Johnson, Fragile Gains: Two Centuries of Canadian and
United States Policy Toward the Indians, 66 WASH. L. REV. 643, 703 (1991);
Porter, supra note 73, at 269; Judith Resnik, Dependent Sovereigns: Indian
Tribes, States, and the Federal Courts, 56 U. CH. L. REV. 671, 712 (1989); Wil-
liams, The Algebra of Federal Indian Law, supra note 56, at 276-77.
152. See Dalia Tsuk, The New Deal Origins of American Legal Pluralism, 29 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 189, 224 (1999).
153. See, e.g., CONST. AND BY-LAws FOR THE BLACKFEET TRIBE OF THE BLACKFEET IN-
DIAN RESERVATION OF MONT., http://thorpe.ou.edu/constitution/blackfeet/bfcont-
TOC.html (last visited June 21, 2006); CHEYENNE-ARAPAHO TRIBES OF OKLA.
CONST. AND BY-LAws, http://thorpe.ou.edu/constitution/Chyn aph.html (last vis-
ited June 21, 2006).
154. See generally Michael D. Petoskey, Tribal Courts, MICH. B.J., May 1988, at 366
(discussing the separation of powers contained in the Constitution of the Grand
Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians).
155. E.g., CONST. AND By LAws OF THE HOOPA VALLEY TRIBE, HooPA VALLEY INDIAN
RESERVATION art. IX, § 1(n), http://www.narf.orglnill/Constitutions/hoopaconstl
hoopatoc.htm (last visited June 21, 2006).
156. See Pub. L. No. 90-284, tit. II, 82 Stat. 73 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1341
(2000)).
157. See Clinton, Tribal Courts and the Federal Union, supra note 56, at 930.
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court forum in which to vindicate civil rights.158 Moreover, the Su-
preme Court in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez15 9 explicitly stated
that persons alleging ICRA violations must use a tribal forum, usually
tribal courts.160 This ruling required tribal courts to develop quickly
and in a manner sophisticated enough to handle complex civil rights
litigation.161
And since the 1990s, Congress has unfailingly made statements of
federal policy in favor of tribal court development. In 1993, Congress
enacted the Indian Tribal Justice Act. 162 There, Congress stated:
The Congress finds and declares that-
(5) tribal justice systems are an essential part of tribal governments and serve
as important forums for ensuring public health and safety and the political
integrity of tribal governments;
(6) Congress and the Federal courts have repeatedly recognized tribal justice
systems as the appropriate forums for the adjudication of disputes affecting
personal and property rights;
(7) traditional tribal justice practices are essential to the maintenance of the
culture and identity of Indian tribes and to the goals of this chapter;
(9) tribal government involvement in and commitment to improving tribal jus-
tice systems is essential to the accomplishment of the goals of this chapter. 16 3
Unfortunately, Congress did not appropriate funds to implement the
legislation.164 Nevertheless, the statute is an important statement
about federal Indian policy relating to tribal courts.
158. See Kevin Gover & Robert Laurence, Avoiding Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez:
The Litigation in Federal Court of Civil Actions Under the Indian Civil Rights
Act, 8 HAMLINE L. REV. 497, 522 (1985); Kevin J. Worthen, Shedding New Light
on an Old Debate: A Federal Indian Law Perspective on Congressional Authority
to Limit Federal Question Jurisdiction, 75 MINN. L. REV. 65, 67 (1990); Alvin J.
Ziontz, After Martinez: Indian Civil Rights Under Tribal Government, 12 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1, 26 (1979).
159. 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
160. See id. at 66-67.
161. See INTRODUCTION TO TRIBAL LEGAL STUDIES, supra note 144, at 258.
162. See Pub. L. No. 103-176, 107 Stat. 2004 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631
(2000)).
163. 25 U.S.C. § 3601 (2000) (emphasis added). See Kiowa Indian Tribe of Okla. v.
Hoover, 150 F.3d 1163, 1166 n.1 (10th Cir. 1998); United States v. Headdress,
953 F. Supp. 1272, 1296 (D. Utah 1996); John v. Baker, 982 P.2d 738, 754 (Alaska
1999); Teague v. Bad River Band of Lake Superior Tribe of Chippewa Indians,
665 N.W.2d 899, 917 (Wis. 2003); Kristen A. Carpenter, Interpreting Indian
Country in State of Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie, 35 TULSA L.J. 73, 139
(1999); Ralph J. Erikstad & James Ganje, Tribal and State Courts-A New Be-
ginning, 71 N.D. L. REV. 569, 573 n.22 (1995); Porter, supra note 73, at 271-72;
Judith Resnik, Multiple Sovereignties: Indian Tribes, States, and the Federal
Government, 79 JUDICATURE 118, 121 (1995).
164. CLINTON, GOLDBERG & TsoSIE, supra note 5, at 48.
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In 2000, Congress enacted the Indian Tribal Justice Technical and
Legal Assistance Act.165 Congress made more explicit findings and
statements of federal Indian policy, reaffirming its 1993 statements:
The Congress finds and declares that-
(2) Indian tribes are sovereign entities and are responsible for exercising gov-
ernmental authority over Indian lands;
(5) tribal justice systems are an essential part of tribal governments and serve
as important forums for ensuring the health and safety and the political integ-
rity of tribal governments;
(6) Congress and the Federal courts have repeatedly recognized tribal justice
systems as the most appropriate forums for the adjudication of disputes af-
fecting personal and property rights on Native lands;
(7) enhancing tribal court systems and improving access to those systems
serves the dual Federal goals of tribal political self-determination and eco-
nomic self-sufficiency .... 166
These are strong statements of federal Indian policy in favor of the
development of tribal court systems, tribal self-government, and, most
importantly, tribal court jurisdiction over Indian lands. 167
4. Sovereign Immunity
The judge-made doctrine of sovereign immunity does not necessa-
rily fit well under the category of congressional statements of federal
policy, but this is one area where the Supreme Court gives grudging
deference to Congress. In cases such as Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v.
Manufacturing Technologies, Inc.,168 and more implicitly, Oklahoma
Tax Commission v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of
Oklahoma,169 the Court has upheld the doctrine of tribal sovereign
immunity from strenuous challenge, but has invited Congress to re-
visit the question. 170 The Court asserted, "In our interdependent and
mobile society, however, tribal immunity extends beyond what is
needed to safeguard tribal self-governance. This is evident when
tribes take part in the Nation's commerce. Tribal enterprises now in-
clude ski resorts, gambling, and sales of cigarettes to non-Indians."171
The Court cited instances where Congress acted to waive the immu-
165. See Pub. L. No. 106-559, 114 Stat. 2778 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 3651-3681
(2000)).
166. 25 U.S.C. § 3651 (2000) (emphasis added).
167. See generally Kevin K. Washburn & Chloe Thompson, A Legacy of Public Law
280: Comparing and Contrasting Minnesota's New Rule for Recognition of Tribal
Court Judgments with the Recent Arizona Rule, 31 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 479,
499-500 (2004).
168. 523 U.S. 751 (1998).
169. 498 U.S. 505 (1991).
170. See Kiowa Tribe, 523 U.S. at 760.
171. Id. at 758 (citing Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145 (1973); Potawat-
omi Tribe, 498 U.S. 505; Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996)).
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nity of certain tribes in certain circumstances and where Congress
could have eliminated the doctrine altogether, concluding that Con-
gress has not yet made a clear statement of intent to eviscerate tribal
sovereign immunity.' 72
And the Court is correct. Congress has often debated the useful-
ness of tribal sovereign immunity, concluding that Indian tribes
should retain the immunity from suit of a sovereign.17 3 So, as a mat-
ter of federal Indian policy, there is plenty of explicit and implicit con-
gressional support for the doctrine.17 4
C. Modern Presidential Statements of Federal Indian Policy
During the "treaty era" of federal Indian policy, the Executive pos-
sessed much more explicit authority to make policy in this area.' 75
The President and his delegates negotiated treaties between Indian
tribes and the federal government, resulting in the cession of hun-
dreds of millions of acres of land from the tribes to the federal govern-
ment.' 76 Moreover, when negotiations failed, it was the President as
Commander-in-Chief who made war on the tribes.17 7 Jealous of the
President and the Senate, the House, in an act of dubious constitu-
tionality, revoked the power of the President to negotiate treaties.' 78
Congress, at that time, became the leading branch of government in
the area of federal Indian policy.
Nevertheless, the bureaucracy wielded an almost unparalleled and
absolute power on the ground in Indian Country throughout the latter
half of the nineteenth century and even into the present day.17 9 The
BIA controlled the day-to-day activities of many reservation Indi-
172. See id. at 758-59 (citing 25 U.S.C. §§ 450f(c)(3), 450n, 1451, 2710(d)(7)(A)(ii)
(2000)).
173. See H.R. REP. No. 106-501, at 3-4 (2000); S. REP. No. 106-150, at 11-12 (1999).
174. See Seielstad, supra note 79, at 751-53; Struve, supra note 56, at 181-82; see
generally Thomas P. Schlosser, Sovereign Immunity: Should the Sovereign Con-
trol the Purse?, 24 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 309 (2000); Kirsten Matoy Carlson, Note,
Towards Tribal Sovereignty and Judicial Efficiency: Ordering the Defenses of Tri-
bal Sovereign Immunity and Exhaustion of Tribal Remedies, 101 MICH. L. REV.
569, 573-75 (2002).
175. See COHEN'S HANDBOOK 2005 ED., supra note 69, § 5.03.
176. See generally Nell Jessup Newton, Indian Claims in the Courts of the Conqueror,
41 AM. U. L. REV. 753 (1992); David Wilkins, Quit-Claiming the Doctrine of Dis-
covery: A Treaty-Based Reappraisal, 23 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 277 (1998).
177. See, e.g., LADuKE, supra note 130, at 99-103; Carol Chomsky, The United
States-Dakota War Trials: A Study in Military Injustice, 43 STAN. L. REV. 13
(1990).
178. See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 201 (2004); COHEN'S HANDBOOK 1ST ED.,
supra note 77, at 77 (citing Appropriation Act of Mar. 3, 1871, 16 Stat. 544, 566
(codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 71 (1988))); Wilkins, supra note 27, at 12.
179. See Cohen, supra note 110, at 352-90; Vine Deloria, Jr. & Clifford Lytle, The
Evolution of Tribal Governments, in INTRODUCTION TO TRIBAL LEGAL STUDIES,
supra note 144, at 63, 64; Hauptman, supra note 69, at 140-41.
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ans. 8 0 The BIA also carefully and quietly wrote off dozens, if not
hundreds, of Indian tribes by refusing to provide services or superin-
tendence.' 8 1 The American Indian Policy Review Commission identi-
fied hundreds of tribes that the BIA had disregarded over the
decades-all without express congressional approval.18 2
However, the IRA's Indian preference provisions, after decades of
obstinate but unsurprising BIA resistance,18 3 began to alter the na-
ture of the agency. Few BIA employees were Indians at the time Con-
gress enacted the IRA.184 Now, more than ninety percent of BIA
employees are Indians, including most employees holding high-level
policymaking positions.' 8 5 As a result, Executive Branch policymak-
ing mirrors congressional federal Indian policy in every important
way since the 1970s.
1. Nixon's Self-Determination Address (and Kennedy and
Johnson)
Executive Branch policymaking, and possibly even federal poli-
cymaking, begins with the President as chief legislator. The first
President in the modern era to advocate for tribal reservation develop-
ment was President Kennedy. 186 His successor, President Johnson,
echoed support for tribal government and reservation development. 18 7
But it was President Nixon who most pointedly issued a statement
about federal Indian policy in his 1970 address to Congress.' 8 8 Presi-
dent Nixon's message was a dramatic reversal and renunciation of the
Termination Era of federal Indian policy, and as some commentators
noted, "set the legislative agenda for Congress in the field of Indian
affairs for the entire decade."189
180. See generally Cohen, supra note 110.
181. See, e.g., Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa & Chippewa Indians v. U.S. Att'y for
the W. Dist. of Mich., 369 F.3d 960, 961-62 (6th Cir. 2004) (discussing improper
administrative termination of the Grand Traverse Band); id. at 962 (discussing
improper administrative termination of Pokagon Band of Potawatomi Indians,
Little River Band of Ottawa Indians, and Little Traverse Bay Bands of Odawa
Indians); see also TASK FORCE TEN, U.S. AM. INDIAN POLICY REVIEW COMM'N, RE-
PORT ON TERMINATED AND NONFEDERALLY RECOGNIZED INDIANS (1976).
182. See TASK FORCE TEN, supra note 181.
183. See generally Cohen, supra note 110, at 383-84 (discussing firing of the most
competent Bureau employees during the 1950s); Note, The Indian: The Forgotten
American, 81 HARv. L. REV. 1818, 1820 (1968).
184. See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 542 (1974).
185. See GETCHES, WILKINSON & WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 232.
186. See CLINTON, GOLDBERG & TsOSIE, supra note 5, at 41; McNICKLE, supra note
103, at 115-16.
187. See McNICKLE, supra note 103, at 124.
188. PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE TO CONGRESS TRANSMITTING RECOMMENDATIONS FOR INDIAN
POLICY, H.R. Doc. No. 91-363 (1970); 116 CONG. REC. 23258 (1970).
189. CLINTON, GOLDBERG, & TsosIE, supra note 5, at 43.
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President Reagan's tenure in office was a mixed bag. Importantly,
the Reagan Administration supported tribal economic development in
numerous ways. That administration's impetus for tribal economic
development was explicitly to "reduce [tribal] dependence on Federal
funds by providing a greater percentage of the cost of their self-gov-
ernment."190 Though the underlying motivation of the President's
federal Indian policy was not charitable,19 1 some results were power-
ful. As had already begun in the 1970s, federal agencies, particularly
the Department of Housing and Urban Development, began to provide
federal funds and financial assistance for tribes to begin operating
bingo halls and card rooms. 19 2 The Court noted the importance of this
federal assistance to tribal gaming establishments in its path-mark-
ing case, California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians,193 which
precluded states from regulating Indian bingo halls.194
2. Government-to-Government Relationship
The federal agencies, particularly the BIA-but also other federal
agencies administering federal lands, property, and natural re-
sources-had long treated Indians and Indian tribes poorly. As noted
above, the BIA has a long history of attempting to forcibly assimilate
and even Christianize Indians, 195 but other federal agencies are guilty
of this cultural imperialism as well.196
President Clinton made no new huge federal Indian policy state-
ments but did issue numerous executive orders to the federal agencies
requiring them to deal with Indian tribes on a government-to-govern-
ment basis and to consult with Indian tribes on any new policy
changes or rules promulgations.1 97 Around this time, several federal
agencies began to engage in a negotiated rulemaking process with In-
dian tribes over the creation of new or amended federal regulations
dealing with critical federal programs. 198
190. Statement of Indian Policy, 1 PUB. PAPERS 97 (Jan. 24, 1983).
191. The first Interior Secretary under President Reagan, James Watt, infamously
criticized Indian tribes as examples of the failures of socialism. See Fletcher,
supra note 126, at 784-85.
192. See Michael D. Cox, The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act: An Overview, 7 ST.
THOMAS L. REV. 769, 772 (1995).
193. 480 U.S. 202, 217-18 (1987).
194. See id. at 221-22.
195. See United States v. Clapox, 35 F. 575, 577 (D. Or. 1888); Cohen, supra note 110,
at 359.
196. See H.R. REP. No. 95-1308, at 1-4 (1978); PEVAR, supra note 146, at 63-64.
197. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,175, 65 Fed. Reg. 67,249 (Nov. 6, 2000); Exec. Order
No. 13,084, 63 Fed. Reg. 27,655 (May 14, 1998); Memorandum on Government-to-
Government Relations With Native American Tribal Governments, 59 Fed. Reg.
22,951 (Apr. 29, 1994); see CLINTON, GOLDBERG & TSOSIE, supra note 5, at 47.
198. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. § 4116(b)(2)(A) (2000) (requiring negotiated rulemaking for
rules promulgation under Native American Housing Assistance and Self-Deter-
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As demonstrated in this Part, Congress and the Executive have
inextricably intertwined many of the interests of the federal govern-
ment with the interests of Indians and Indian tribes. But, as Part III
establishes, despite the unwavering federal Indian policy expressed by
the political branches of the federal government in favor of tribal self-
governance, tribal court development, economic development, and
other important tribal interests, the Supreme Court has frequently ig-
nored those policy statements.
III. UNGROUNDED FEDERAL JUDGE-MADE INDIAN LAW, OR
THE SUPREME COURT AS FEDERAL
INDIAN POLICYMAKER
Federal common law is judge-made law.19 9 It is law that the fed-
eral courts propound in areas of federal subject matters where no act
of Congress controls and no regulation of the Executive Branch ap-
plies. Where Congress hears of a federal court decision relying upon
federal common law, it has the authority to legislate to codify the deci-
sion, modify or expand the decision, or even reverse the decision.20 0
But what happens when the Supreme Court makes federal com-
mon law in a particular area of federal subject matter and Congress
has little or no constitutional authority in that area? Can Congress
still overrule, modify, or codify the Court's pronouncement? Or does
the Court retain exclusive power to decide those matters? What is the
role of the Executive?
This Part provides an overview of how these questions are an-
swered by the federal government in the area of federal Indian law. In
short, as some commentators have already alleged, it appears that the
Supreme Court, at least potentially, could assert virtually unlimited
authority over these matters-a sort of judicial plenary power to make
federal policy and to make law.20 1 Other commentators suggest that
where federal positive law is silent, state constitutional and statutory
mination Act); see generally Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-
648, 104 Stat. 4970 (codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 561-570 (2000)).
199. See Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99
HARv. L. REV. 881, 890-91 (1986); Michael P. Van Alstine, Federal Common Law
in an Age of Treaties, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 892, 931 (2004); cf. Philip P. Frickey, A
Common Law for Our Age of Colonialism: A Judicial Divestiture of Indian Tribal
Authority Over Nonmembers, 109 YALE L.J. 1, 3 (1999); Laurence, Symmetry and
Asymmetry, supra note 36, at 906; Alex Tallchief Skibine, The Court's Use of the
Implicit Divestiture Doctrine to Implement its Imperfect Notion of Federalism in
Indian Country, 36 TULSA L.J. 267, 293-94 (2000).
200. See Field, supra note 199, at 896.
201. See Clinton, There Is No Federal Supremacy Clause, supra note 56, at 214; Porn-
mersheim, supra note 25, at 328; Prakash, supra note 9, at 1070-71.
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law fills the gap. 20 2 These commentators suggest further that federal
common law itself is possibly an impermissible infringement on state
law.203
Perhaps the best example of how the Supreme Court has asserted
this plenary power is the case of County of Yakima v. Confederated
Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation.204 That decision held
that lands alienated under an allotment statute, but reacquired by the
tribe or individual Indians, were taxable by the state.20 5 The Court
began by noting that the federal Indian policy at the time the lands
had been alienated was "to extinguish tribal sovereignty, erase reser-
vation boundaries, and force the assimilation of Indians into the soci-
ety at large."20 6 The Court then stated that the federal Indian policy
changed in 1934 with the enactment of the IRA, with Congress
"[r]eturning to the principles of tribal self-determination and self-gov-
ernance which had characterized the pre-Dawes Act era."20 7 How-
ever, the Court pointed out that Congress did not enact legislation
that would have reversed the damage done during the Allotment
Era.2 08 The Yakima Nation argued that, while the allotment act
opened the door to state taxation authority on alienated lands,2 09 the
IRA210-and later, the codified Indian Country definitional stat-
ute2 1 -closed that door. 212 The Court rejected this argument, rely-
ing on judge-made law in other contexts; namely that implied repeals
202. See, e.g., Martha A. Field, The Legitimacy of Federal Common Law, 12 PACE L.
REV. 303, 305-06 (1992).
203. See, e.g., id.
204. 502 U.S. 251 (1992).
205. See id. at 270.
206. Id. at 254 (citing In re Heff, 197 U.S. 488, 499 (1905)).
207. Id. at 255.
208. See id. at 255-56 (citing WILCOMB E. WASHBURN, RED MAN'S LAND/WHITE MAN'S
LAw 145 (1971)).
209. Section 6 of the General Allotment Act provided that, at the expiration of a period
of years where lands allotted to Indians would be tax-exempt, state taxes would
begin to apply. See 25 U.S.C. § 349 (2000).
210. As the Court noted, in enacting the IRA:
Congress halted further allotments and extended indefinitely the ex-
isting periods of trust applicable to already allotted (but not yet fee-pat-
ented) Indian lands. In addition, the Act provided for restoring
unallotted surplus Indian lands to tribal ownership, and for acquiring,
on behalf of the tribes, lands "within or without existing reservations."
County of Yakima, 502 U.S. at 255 (citations omitted) (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 465
(2000)).
211. As the Court characterized the Nation's argument, "In 1948, for instance, Con-
gress defined 'Indian country' to include all fee land within the boundaries of an
existing reservation, whether or not held by an Indian, and pre-empted state
criminal laws within 'Indian country' insofar as offenses by and against Indians
were concerned." Id. at 260 (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 1151-1153 (2000); Seymour v.
Superintendent of Wash. State Penitentiary, 368 U.S. 351 (1962)).
212. See id. at 259-60.
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of federal statutes are not favored,213 and when two or more statutes
are in apparent conflict but are capable of co-existence, the Court
must regard both as effective. 2 14 There was no federal statute that
controlled the outcome of the case, but there was a definitive state-
ment of federal Indian policy from Congress that the ravages of the
Allotment Era should be stopped, and where possible, reversed. The
Court disregarded federal Indian policy to reach an opposing out-
come-one directly in favor of state governments and non-Indian
landowners, the direct beneficiaries of the Allotment Era.
The Court even rejected (or, as Justice Blackmun stated, "misap-
plie[d]" 2 15 ) its own precedents. The Court's precedents supported the
Nation, requiring that Congress must make its intention to open In-
dian lands to state taxation "unmistakably clear."216 Despite a force-
ful statement of federal Indian policy by Congress and strong
Supreme Court precedent in favor of the tax immunity of Indian
tribes, the Court authorized state taxation. The Court, in an almost
arrogant challenge to Indian tribes and Congress, instructed the Na-
tion to seek legislation from Congress to reverse the result;2 17 al-
though, in fact, Congress had already legislated nearly sixty years
before to abandon the Allotment Era. 218
The County of Yakima opinion is merely one case that typifies
Rehnquist Court Indian cases where the Court asserts a plenary poli-
cymaking power. The elements of these cases usually run along these
lines: (1) the subject matter is outside the scope of the limited terms of
the Indian Commerce Clause; (2) the Court must choose between two
or more competing interests-typically federal, tribal, state, and indi-
vidual; and (3) no statute controls the outcome. The Court's judge-
made doctrines at issue in these sorts of cases often are the doctrines
of implicit divestiture of tribal inherent authority, and the plenary
and exclusive power of Congress to legislate in the area of Indian af-
fairs, as discussed below.
213. See id. at 262 (quoting Posadas v. Nat'l City Bank, 296 U.S. 497, 503 (1936)).
214. See id. at 265-66 (quoting Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974)).
215. Id. at 270 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
216. Id. at 258 (majority opinion) (quoting Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe, 471 U.S. 759,
765 (1985), citing California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202,
215 n.17 (1987)).
217. See id. at 265.
218. See 25 U.S.C. § 461 (2000) ("On and after June 18, 1934, no land of any Indian
reservation, created or set apart by treaty or agreement with the Indians, Act of
Congress, Executive order, purchase, or otherwise, shall be allotted in severalty
to any Indian.").
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A. The Court Doubts the Inherent Sovereign Powers of
Indian Tribes and Expands the Doctrine of Implicit
Divestiture
Felix S. Cohen famously described the formulation that federal
courts had announced in decades of cases-acquiesced to by Congress
and the Executive-that Indian tribes retained the inherent powers of
sovereignty that they possessed since time immemorial except those
the tribes had agreed to release through treaties and other agree-
ments, or those Congress explicitly divested from the tribes via legis-
lation.219 Cohen's statement was accurate at that time except for one
glaring omission: The very first Indian case the Court decided in 1823,
Johnson v. M'Intosh,220 was a case of implicit divestiture. There, the
Court held that Indian tribes had been divested of the right to alienate
their land to any person or entity except the conquering sovereign.2 2 1
Cohen's statement was perhaps an accurate statement of normative
federal Indian law, but Johnson illustrates that the very foundation of
federal Indian law is based on the notion of implicit divestiture of in-
herent tribal sovereignty. 22 2 Implicit divestiture, a notion that has
been criticized by commentators, 2 23 is the doctrine whereby an Indian
tribe might lose an aspect of its inherent sovereign authority without
either an act of Congress or a treaty expressing that divestiture. 22 4
219. Cohen's exact statement was this: "[TIhose powers which are lawfully vested in an
Indian tribe are not, in general, delegated powers granted by express acts of Con-
gress, but rather inherent powers of a limited sovereignty which has never been
extinguished." COHEN'S HANDBOOK 1ST ED., supra note 77, at 122.
220. 21 U.S. 543 (1823).
221. See id. at 604-05.
222. See N. Bruce Duthu, Implicit Divestiture of Tribal Powers: Locating Legitimate
Sources of Authority in Indian Country, 19 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 353, 371 (1994)
(discussing the result of Johnson as an implicit divestiture of tribal authority).
223. See Bethany R. Berger, Justice and the Outsider: Jurisdiction over Nonmembers
in Tribal Legal Systems, 37 ARIz. ST. L.J. 1047 (2005); Bethany R. Berger, "Power
over this Unfortunate Race": Race, Politics and Indian Law in United States v.
Rogers, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1957, 2046-49 (2004); Duthu, supra note 222, at
353-402; Frickey, supra note 199, at 43-48; Frickey, supra note 87, at 437-38
n.243; Frickey, supra note 30, at 1160-64; Getches, Conquering the Cultural
Frontier, supra note 27, at 1595-617; Robert Laurence, The Dominant Society's
Judicial Reluctance to Allow Tribal Civil Law to Apply to Non-Indians: Reserva-
tion Diminishment, Modern Demography and the Indian Civil Rights Act, 30 U.
RICH. L. REV. 781, 800-05 (1996); McSloy, supra note 56, at 278; Laurie Reynolds,
"Jurisdiction" in Federal Indian Law: Confusion, Contradiction, and Supreme
Court Precedent, 27 N.M. L. REV. 359, 377-80 (1997); Skibine, supra note 199, at
270-80; Dean B. Suagee, The Supreme Court's "Whack-A-Mole" Game Theory in
Federal Indian Law, a Theory that Has No Place in the Realm of Environmental
Law, GREAT PLAINS NAT. RESOURCES J., Fall 2002, at 90, 97-124.
224. See, e.g., Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001) (deciding that Indian tribes do not
possess civil adjudicatory jurisdiction over nonmembers except in very narrow
circumstances); Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997) (same); Duro v.
Reina, 495 U.S 676 (1990) (deciding that Indian tribes do not possess the author-
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Cohen's statement, however, was influential on federal courts and
was even quoted, in part, by the Court in United States v. Wheeler,22 5
and virtually adopted in toto by Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe.22 6
In Wheeler, the Court stated, "The sovereignty that the Indian tribes
retain is of a unique and limited character. It exists only at the suffer-
ance of Congress and is subject to complete defeasance. But until
Congress acts, the tribes retain their existing sovereign powers." 22 7
The Court in Wheeler, however, had to acknowledge that less than a
month earlier it had just held, through use of the implicit-divestiture
doctrine, that Indian tribes had no authority to prosecute non-Indi-
ans.228 The Court in Merrion seemed to overtly reject the implicit-
divestiture doctrine once and for all. In Merrion, the Court first
quoted a Senate report from 1879 presaging the Cohen formulation:
"We have considered [Indian tribes] as invested with the right of self-
government and jurisdiction over the persons and property within the
limits of the territory they occupy, except so far as that jurisdiction has
been restrained and abridged by treaty or act of Congress."229 Citing
Wheeler, the Court then stated, "Only the Federal Government may
limit a tribe's exercise of its sovereign authority."23 0 This is consistent
with the Cohen formulation that only Congress, through legislation,
or the Executive Branch, in negotiating a treaty or other agreement,
can divest an Indian tribe of inherent sovereignty, but it does not ex-
clude the federal courts. When confronted with the argument that the
tribe in Merrion had been implicitly divested of its inherent power, the
Court, following the above-stated rule, looked only to the acts of Con-
gress. 23 1 Upon finding no act of Congress divesting the tribe of its
relevant inherent authority, the Court concluded that there had been
no divestiture.232 In fact, the Court declared in a footnote, "Because
the Tribe retains all inherent attributes of sovereignty that have not
been divested by the Federal Government, the proper inference from
silence ... is that the sovereign power ... remains intact."23 3 At the
conclusion of the majority opinion, the Court stated, "[T]he Tribe may
enforce its severance tax unless and until Congress divests this power,
ity to prosecute nonmember Indians); Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435
U.S. 191 (1978) (deciding that Indian tribes do not possess the authority to prose-
cute non-Indians).
225. 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
226. 455 U.S. 130 (1982).
227. Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 323.
228. See id. (citing Oliphant, 435 U.S. 191).
229. Merrion, 455 U.S. at 140 (emphasis added) (alteration in original) (internal quo-
tation marks omitted) (quoting S. REP. No. 45-698, at 1-2 (1879)).
230. Id. at 147 (citing Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 322).
231. See id. at 149-52.
232. See id. at 152.
233. Id. at 148 n.14.
[Vol. 85:121
2006] FEDERAL INDIAN POLICY
an action that Congress has not taken to date."23 4 Affirming the adop-
tion of the Cohen formulation in Merrion, the Court stated in Iowa
Mutual Insurance Co. v. LaPlante,23 5 "Civil jurisdiction over [the ac-
tivities of non-Indians on reservation land] presumptively lies in the
tribal courts unless affirmatively limited by a specific treaty provision
or federal statute."236
It appears that, with Merrion, followed by Iowa Mutual, the Court
had chosen to restrict-if not eliminate altogether-its implicit-di-
vestiture doctrine. However, given that Wheeler was decided at the
same time as Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, the first shocking
implicit-divestiture decision of the modern era, and given further that
Merrion has been virtually ignored by the Court since its filing23 7 and
the statement in Iowa Mutual was explicitly discredited by the
Court,238 it is safe to say that Cohen's normative statement is only
part of the law.
Even the Court is uncertain or unclear on when the implicit-divest-
iture doctrine applies. Borrowing from the notion in Cherokee Nation
v. Georgia23 9 that Indian tribes are "domestic dependent nations,"2 40
a formulation necessary for Chief Justice Marshall to reach his conclu-
sions in the Marshall Trilogy,24 1 the Court now holds that Indian
tribes do not retain authority "inconsistent with their [dependent sta-
tus]."242 But in 1980, the Court decided the landmark Indian taxation
case Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reserva-
tion,243 noting:
234. Id. at 159 (emphasis added).
235. 480 U.S. 9 (1987).
236. Id. at 18 (citing Merrion, 455 U.S. at 148 n.14; Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez,
436 U.S. 49, 60 (1978)).
237. See Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 360 (2001) (referring to Merrion as a "minor
exception").
238. See Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 453 (1997) ("[T]he statement stands
for nothing more than the unremarkable proposition that, where tribes possess
authority to regulate the activities of nonmembers, '[c]ivil jurisdiction over [dis-
putes arising out of] such activities presumptively lies in the tribal courts.'"
(quoting Iowa Mutual, 480 U.S. at 18)). But see Hicks, 533 U.S. at 358 n.2 ("Our
holding in this case is limited to the question of tribal-court jurisdiction over state
officers enforcing state law. We leave open the question of tribal-court jurisdic-
tion over nonmember defendants in general.").
239. 30 U.S. 1 (1831).
240. Id. at 17.
241. The three cases comprise the origins of federal Indian law and the critical opin-
ions are all authored by Chief Justice John Marshall. See Worcester v. Georgia,
31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831);
Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
242. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 229 (2004) (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting
United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978)); see Hicks, 533 U.S. at 359
(quoting Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564 (1981)).
243. 447 U.S. 134 (1980).
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Tribal powers are not implicitly divested by virtue of the tribes' dependent sta-
tus. This Court has found such a divestiture in cases where the exercise of
tribal sovereignty would be inconsistent with the overriding interests of the
National Government, as when the tribes seek to engage in foreign relations,
alienate their lands to non-Indians without federal consent, or prosecute non-
Indians in tribal courts which do not accord the full protections of the Bill of
Rights. 2
4 4
In Coluille, the Court concluded that Indian tribes could be implicitly
divested of their inherent authority only when the exercise of that au-
thority is inconsistent with the overriding interests of the national
government. If we take Johnson as an example of a case where the
Court had no choice but to validate the actions of the young American
government, as some have, 24 5 then one can make the argument that
Johnson is an example of implicit divestiture under the consistent-
with-overriding-national-interest test.
But the more recent cases, Hicks among them, have restated that
rule much more expansively from a consistent-with-overriding-na-
tional-interest test to consistency with a tribe's dependent status.
Considering that Congress has frequently declared tribal-court juris-
diction and tribal-government development to be consistent with na-
tional interest,2 46 and that Indian tribes are now less dependent on
the federal government than in the last century or more, it makes no
sense for the Court to adopt this new consistency-with-dependent-sta-
tus test.
What authority is "inconsistent" with the status of Indian tribes as
"dependent"? The Court and the Court alone decides what authority
is inconsistent with the dependent status of Indian tribes. The Court
has disregarded the Congress and Executive Branch statements of
federal Indian policy in favor of its own policy choices.
B. The Court Doubts that Tribal Economic Development
and Taxation Authority are Tribal Government
Necessities
The Rehnquist Court's preference for the authority of states and
the rights of nonmembers in Indian Country becomes clearest in the
context of taxation and regulation. The Warren Court's jurisprudence
in this area generated the per se rule in Williams v. Lee2 47 that Indi-
ans are free to make their own laws and be governed by them within
Indian Country.248 Further, under Williams, state laws that conflict
244. Id. at 153-54 (emphasis added).
245. See Eric Kades, The Dark Side of Efficiency: Johnson v. M'Intosh and the Expro-
priation of American Indian Lands, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1065 (2000) (arguing that
Johnson created a source of revenue for the new American federal government).
246. See supra subsection II.B.3.
247. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
248. See id. at 220, 223.
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with this right to self-government are preempted by federal law. 249
Unfortunately for those in favor of a bright-line rule, then-Justice
Rehnquist opened the door to state authority in Indian Country by
announcing a watering-down of the Williams test in Moe v. Confeder-
ated Salish & Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Indian Reservation.250
In Moe, then-Justice Rehnquist wrote that an Indian retailer sell-
ing cigarettes to non-Indians free from state taxes was not free to, as
he characterized it, "flout" state law in order to reap "the competitive
advantage which the Indian seller doing business on tribal land enjoys
over all other cigarette retailers, within and without the reserva-
tion."251 The Court required Indian traders to collect state cigarette
taxes from non-Indians for the first time in its history.252 The Court
acknowledged that Congress had intended for Indians and Indian
tribes to trade without the burden of state interference, 2 5 3 but held
that the interest extended only to trading between Indians. 254
The Court has taken then-Justice Rehnquist's concern about the
alleged "competitive advantage" that Indian retailers might have and
adopted a whole line of cases castigating Indians and Indian tribes for
"marketing" an "exemption" from state taxation or regulation. 255 In
short, because the Court in Moe questioned the public policy of
whether Indians and Indian tribes should be allowed to maintain a
competitive advantage by marketing an exemption from state taxation
and regulation, that suspicion has now become the law. Given that
Congress was aware of cases such as Williams and Worcester that
drew a wall around Indian Country keeping out state laws and did
nothing, the Court by negative implication256 could easily have left
Indians retailers alone. If Congress wanted to make a change, then
the Court would wait until that day. But it chose to impose its own
policy choice upon Indian retailers.
249. See id. at 220.
250. 425 U.S. 463 (1976).
251. Id. at 482.
252. See id. at 483.
253. See id. at 482 (citing Warren Trading Post Co. v. Ariz. Tax Comm'n, 380 U.S. 685,
686, 691 (1965)).
254. See id.
255. See Dep't of Taxation & Fin. v. Milhelm Attea & Bros., 512 U.S. 61, 72 (1994);
Washington v. Confed. Tribes of the Colville Indian Reserv'n, 447 U.S. 134, 155
(1980); Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian Cmty. v. Arizona, 50 F.3d 734, 737 (9th
Cir. 1995) (citing Chemehuevi Indian Tribe v. Cal. State Bd. of Equalization, 800
F.2d 1446, 1449 (9th Cir. 1986)); Squaxin Island Tribe v. Washington, 781 F.2d
715, 720 (9th Cir. 1986); Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation v. Richards, 241 F.
Supp. 2d 1295, 1310 (D. Kan. 2003), rev'd, 379 F.3d 979 (10th Cir. 2004), rev'd
sub nom., Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation, 126 S. Ct. 676 (2005); Sac
& Fox Nation v. Richards, 158 F. Supp. 2d 1274, 1277 (D. Kan. 2001); United
States v. Finn, 919 F. Supp. 1305, 1340 (D. Minn. 1995).
256. See Frickey, supra note 30, at 1157-58 (arguing that "negative inferences" are
"weak" arguments).
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The policy choices made by the Court have gone only one way since
then: against tribal retailers. The question of competitive advantage
does not work both ways. In Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico,2 57
the Court held that states may tax the on-reservation business activi-
ties of non-Indian-owned businesses, even where the tribe was already
imposing its own tax.2 58 This result was presaged by cases such as
Moe, but the impact on Indian tribes has been nothing short of devas-
tating. Cotton Petroleum authorized a system of double taxation that
works to the extreme detriment of Indian tribes.2 59 Professor Philip
Frickey noted that Congress had once authorized state taxation in this
circumstance in 1927, but then repealed that law in favor of another
in 1938, this time without language authorizing state taxation.260
Professor Frickey noted, "[A] good argument arises on the face of the
statutes that Congress knew how to authorize state taxation and
failed to do so."261 The Court could have noted these statutes and re-
lied upon implicit congressional intent through negative implication,
but it chose not to.
With the Court deciding that states were authorized to tax and
regulate the activities of non-Indians in Indian Country-a clear re-
versal of congressional policy to the contrary-the Court opened the
door to double-taxation and the evisceration of nascent tribal econo-
mies. This result conflicts with express federal Indian policy in favor
of tribal self-sufficiency. 26 2
As noted earlier, the mass of the Rehnquist Court's Indian cases
are decided in accordance with federal common law. The Court's
doubts as to the constitutional authority for congressional plenary
power, tribal inherent authority, and the contours of Indian Country
supply a motivation to revisit each case reaching the Court anew. In
short, the lack of constitutional grounding for federal Indian law
opens the door to new Supreme Court precedent. Since nothing in the
Constitution prevents or even discourages the Court from making pol-
257. 490 U.S. 163 (1989).
258. See id. at 173.
259. See Clinton, The Dormant Indian Commerce Clause, supra note 64, at 1216-24;
Frickey, supra note 30, at 1189 n.263; Judith V. Royster, Mineral Development in
Indian Country: The Evolution of Tribal Control over Mineral Resources, 29
TULSA L.J. 541, 579 (1994); Valencia-Weber, supra note 56, at 420 n.52; Gloria
Valencia-Weber, Shrinking Indian Country: A State Offensive to Divest Tribal
Sovereignty, 27 CoNN. L. REV. 1281, 1318 (1995); Susan M. Williams, State Taxa-
tion on Indian Reservations: The Impact of Cotton Petroleum Corporation v. New
Mexico, 36 FED. B. NEWS & J. 431 (1989).
260. See Frickey, supra note 30, at 1189 n.263 (comparing Indian Oil Act of 1927, 25
U.S.C. § 398e (2000), with Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938, 25 U.S.C.
§§ 396a-396g (2000)).
261. Id.
262. See supra subsection II.B.2.
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icy choices, there is no respect for stare decisis in the Court's Indian
cases.
A quick review of the cases discussed in this Article establishes a
few of the Court's policy choices. First, the Court is suspicious of the
authority asserted by Indian tribes over nonmembers.263 In line with
its "states' rights" decisions, the Court tends to vacate tribal exercises
of authority, either opening the door to state authority in Indian
Country26 4 or purposefully leaving a vacuum for Congress to fill.265
Second, the Court has acted to protect the economic interests of non-
Indians, non-Indian-owned companies, and the tax base of state and
local governments-all at the direct expense of tribal economic and
taxation interests. 26 6 In Indian Country, the Court tends to draw the
lines in terms of economic competition and fairness against Indians
and Indian tribes.
It seems clear that Congress has strongly supported the exercise of
tribal sovereign authority in regulatory, taxation, adjudicatory juris-
diction, and in tribal economic development through its legislative au-
thority, but also in its authority to declare the federal Indian policy for
the nation. But the Court does not weigh seriously the congressional
statements of federal Indian policy in its decisions, choosing to apply
its own policies and preferences. As Professor Joe Singer wrote:
[T]he Court is increasingly reluctant to recognize the special rights that go
along with the special status of Indian nations. At the same time, the Court
also often fails to accord Indian nations the same rights as others in cases
where the tribes are indeed similarly situated to non-Indians. 2 6 7
IV. THE MIDDLE GROUND-PRECONSTITUTIONAL
CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORITY OVER
INDIAN AFFAIRS
Without a path to follow, the Supreme Court moves on as before.
In the area of Indian law, the Court does not have policy guidance to
follow that it trusts-that is, guidance from Congress-nor textual
guidance from the Constitution. As Part IV demonstrates, the Court
has taken the mantle of lead federal Indian policymaker, or as Profes-
263. See ALEINIKOFF, supra note 14, at 114-21; Frickey, supra note 199, at 45-46;
Singer, supra note 36, at 666-67.
264. See, e.g., Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001); Cotton Petrol. Corp. v. New Mex-
ico, 490 U.S. 163 (1989); Washington v. Confed. Tribes of the Colville Indian
Reserv'n, 447 U.S. 134 (1980); Moe v. Confed. Salish & Kootenai Tribes of the
Flathead Reserv'n, 425 U.S. 463 (1976).
265. See, e.g., Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645 (2001); Strate v. A-1 Con-
tractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997).
266. See, e.g., Atkinson Trading, 532 U.S. 645; Cotton Petrol., 490 U.S. 163; Confed.
Tribes of the Colville Indian Reserv'n, 447 U.S. 134; Moe, 425 U.S. 463.
267. Singer, supra note 27, at 3.
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sors Frank Pommersheim and Robert Clinton artfully noted, adopted
the doctrine of "judicial plenary power."268
A. The Court Doubts the Existence of Congressional
Plenary and Exclusive Power over Indian Affairs
The Justices on the Rehnquist Court were as focused on locating a
source of textual support for the authority exercised by Congress as
any Court in the history of Supreme Court jurisprudence. 26 9 And
where there is textual support for congressional action, the Rehnquist
Court tended to read the language narrowly. 2 70 Its most controversial
cases relevant to this discussion are the cases relating to the Com-
merce Clause. For the first time since the Lochner-era Court, the
Rehnquist Court invalidated acts of Congress as exceeding its author-
ity under the Commerce Clause.2 71 The Court's decision in Seminole
Tribe of Florida v. Florida,27 2 a watershed Eleventh Amendment deci-
sion in favor of states' rights, also foreshadowed the limits of the In-
dian Commerce Clause as a grant of authority to Congress. 27 3
This development is critical to federal Indian policy because the
sole source of explicit textual authority from which Congress may
draw upon to legislate in the area of Indian affairs is the Indian Com-
merce Clause.2 74 In few (if any) other areas of federal policy is Con-
gress so limited. For example, in the area of civil rights, by contrast,
Congress may also draw upon its enforcement authority under Section
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.2 7 5 The Constitution does not in-
clude a similarly broad grant of authority to Congress to legislate on
Indian affairs. 27 6
268. Clinton, There Is No Federal Supremacy Clause, supra note 56, at 214; Pommer-
sheim, supra note 25, at 328; see also Frickey, (Native) American Exceptionalism,
supra note 27, at 460 (noting that "some Justices... suggest that the Court, not
Congress, should have the final say about some matters").
269. See generally Michael C. Doff, The Limits of Socratic Deliberation, 112 HARv. L.
REV. 4, 16-17 (1998); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statu-
tory Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331, 405 (1991).
270. See generally Schwartz, supra note 57.
271. See Schwartz, supra note 57, at 165-66 (citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S.
549 (1995)); Doff, supra note 269, at 64.
272. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
273. See TUSHNET, supra note 6, at 52-53.
274. See U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 3; Riley, supra note 143, at 205.
275. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
276. For more detailed discussion of the origins of the Indian Commerce Clause and
its purpose, see Cleveland, supra note 56; Clinton, There Is No Federal
Supremacy Clause, supra note 56; Clinton, The Dormant Indian Commerce
Clause, supra note 64; Clinton, Redressing the Legacy of Conquest, supra note 56;
N. Bruce Duthu, The Thurgood Marshall Papers and the Quest for a Principled
Theory of Tribal Sovereignty: Fueling the Fires of Tribal/State Conflict, 21 VT. L.
REV. 47 (1996); Martha A. Field, The Seminole Case, Federalism, and the Indian
Commerce Clause, 29 ARIz. ST. L.J. 29 (1997); Getches, Beyond Indian Law,
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Ironically, despite the inherent limits of the text of the Indian
Commerce Clause, the Court held for almost a century that Congress
had unlimited and exclusive authority to determine federal Indian
policy and law2 77-and even the authority to regulate the internal af-
fairs of Indian tribes.2 78 To this day, the federal courts continue to
affirm that Congress has plenary and exclusive authority.2 79 The un-
limited and absolute nature of this authority was moderated only by
the imposition of a rational basis test in 1977.280 The plenary power
of Congress in Indian affairs has generated an enormous amount of
vociferous scholarly debate in the federal Indian law academic com-
munity, with the argument that Congress has no business regulating
at least the internal affairs of Indian tribes being most popular.28 '
It is now clear that many statutes contained in Title 25 rest on the
plenary and exclusive authority of Congress to legislate in this area
that the Court has always recognized. 28 2 The Justices are not una-
ware of the precarious nature of congressional authority. Justice
Thomas, for example, argued recently in United States v. Lara that
congressional plenary power is a doctrine without firm textual footing
supra note 27; Richard Monette, When Tribes Sue States: How "Federal Indian
Law" Offers an Opportunity to Clarify Sovereign Immunity Jurisprudence, 14
QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 401 (1994); and Skibine, supra note 36.
277. See, e.g., United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200 (2004); Negonsott v. Samuels,
507 U.S. 99, 103 (1993); Cotton Petrol. Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 192
(1989); Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd. v. Bureau of Revenue, 458 U.S. 832, 837 (1982);
Washington v. Confed. Tribes of the Colville Indian Reserv'n, 447 U.S. 134, 136
(1980); White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 142 (1980); Mor-
ton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 552 (1974); McClanahan v. State Tax Comm'n of
Ariz,, 411 U.S. 164, 172 n.7 (1973); Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565
(1903).
278. See Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 294 (1902); United States v. Kagama,
118 U.S. 375 (1886); Comment, Federal Plenary Power in Indian Affairs After
Weeks and Sioux Nation, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 235, 246-50 (1982).
279. See, e.g., United States v. Gregg, No. CR 04-30068, 2005 WL 1806345, at *1
(D.S.D. July 27, 2005).
280. See Del. Tribal Bus. Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73, 84-85 (1977).
281. See supra note 56.
282. See generally Morton, 417 U.S. at 552 ("Literally every piece of legislation dealing
with Indian tribes and reservations, and certainly all legislation dealing with the
BIA, single out for special treatment a constituency of tribal Indians living on or
near reservations. If these laws, derived from historical relationships and explic-
itly designed to help only Indians, were deemed invidious racial discrimination,
an entire Title of the United States Code (25 U.S.C.) would be effectively erased
and the solemn commitment of the Government toward the Indians would be
jeopardized."); Williams v. Babbitt, 115 F.3d 657, 665 n.8 (9th Cir. 1997) (sug-
gesting that Congress has a "compelling interest" in legislating for the benefit of
Indian tribes).
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and should be revisited. 28 3 This debate is moving from the ivory
tower to the Supreme Court-and in short order.
The Supreme Court has long recognized that the Indian Commerce
Clause alone does not confer plenary power upon Congress. In the
very first case in which the Court could be said to acknowledge con-
gressional plenary power, United States v. Kagama,28 4 the Court ex-
plicitly stated that the grant of authority to Congress under the
Indian Commerce Clause was insufficient to authorize the Major
Crimes Act,285 which extended federal criminal jurisdiction into In-
dian Country.286 Nevertheless, the Court did find sufficient congres-
sional authority in another source-Indian treaties. 28 7  More
specifically, because Indian tribes had sometimes given themselves up
to the protection of the United States in treaties, the Court construed
the word "protection" to mean "dependence."288 It was the "depen-
dence" of Indian tribes upon the federal government that authorized
Congress to take this action. It is as if one tribe's "dependence"
amounted to all tribes' dependence.289
After Lone Wolf, the Court did not question congressional plenary
power until the 1970s, asserting that the political-question doctrine
283. See 541 U.S. 193, 224, 226 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring); see also id. at 219
("The tribes, by contrast, are not part of this constitutional order, and their sover-
eignty is not guaranteed by it.").
284. 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
285. Id. at 378-79 ("But we think it would be a very strained construction of [the In-
dian Commerce] [Cilause that a system of criminal laws for Indians living peace-
ably in their reservations, which left out the entire code of trade and intercourse
laws justly enacted under that provision, and established punishments for the
common-law crimes of murder, manslaughter, arson, burglary, larceny, and the
like, without any reference to their relation to any kind of commerce, was author-
ized by the grant of power to regulate commerce with the Indian tribes.").
286. Indian Appropriation Act of 1885, 23 Stat. 385 (1885).
287. See Kagama, 118 U.S. at 383-84.
288. See id. at 384 (citing Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832)). It is clear, how-
ever, that in Worcester, the Court construed the word "protection" as used in the
Treaty of Hopewell. See Treaty of Hopewell with the Cherokee Nation art. III, 7
Stat. 18 (1785), reprinted in CLINTON, GOLDBERG & TsOsIE, supra note 5, at 5
("The said Indians for themselves and their respective tribes and towns do ac-
knowledge all the Cherokees to be under the protection of the United States of
America, and of no other sovereign whosoever." (emphasis added)). In short, in
that treaty, "protection" amounts to little more than a declaration of loyalty. The
treaty went on, in Article 5, to also note that non-Indians who move onto Chero-
kee territory without their permission "forfeit the protection of the United States,
and the Indians may punish him or not as they please." Id. This is prototype
treaty language implementing "measured separatism," as defined by Wilkinson.
See supra note 71. This is not "dependence," as the Kagama Court alleged, espe-
cially given that the Cherokee Nation had developed an extremely sophisticated
government and was "dependent" on no one. See GETCHES, WILKINSON & WIL-
LIAMS, supra note 1, at 96.
289. See Prakash, supra note 9, at 1071 ("To the 'Courts of the conqueror,' Indian
tribes are all the same." (quoting Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 588 (1823))).
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precluded the Court from second-guessing the choices made by Con-
gress and the Executive in federal Indian policy.29 0
B. A Preconstitutional Congressional Power to Legislate in
Indian Affairs?
Since Kagama, the Court has not delved deeply into the sources of
congressional authority over and with Indian tribes. The Court in
United States v. Lara articulated for the first time a notion that con-
gressional plenary and exclusive power over Indian affairs is author-
ized by "preconstitutional powers necessarily inherent in a Federal
Government, namely, powers that this Court has described as 'neces-
sary concomitants of nationality."' 291
For this proposition, the Court cited United States v. Curtiss-
Wright Export Corp.29 2 The Court in Curtiss-Wright stated:
[T]he investment of the federal government with the powers of external
sovereignty did not depend upon the affirmative grants of the Constitution.
The powers to declare and wage war, to conclude peace, to make treaties, to
maintain diplomatic relations with other sovereignties, if they had never been
mentioned in the Constitution, would have vested in the federal government
as necessary concomitants of nationality. 2 9 3
In Lara, the Court did not indulge in the formulism with which the
Rehnquist Court has often resorted. But the problem is that the
"preconstitutional" authority the Court recognized in Lara is therefore
unlimited and unconstrained except by the Court itself. Nothing in the
Constitution constrains Congress or the Court because there is noth-
ing in the Constitution. The Court has extended to Congress, finally,
a modern theory as to why the federal government has authority over
Indian tribes, but in doing so it has also extended that power to itself.
Professor Pommersheim's prediction or observation of a "judicial ple-
nary power" appears to have found further hold in this notion of a
"preconstitutional" power to deal with Indian tribes.
The result in Lara no doubt was a powerful victory for Indian
tribes and the United States.294 The Court concluded that Congress
does indeed have the power to ratchet up tribal inherent authority,
recognizing congressional authority to reverse the Court's implicit-di-
290. See supra Part II.
291. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 201-02 (2004) (quoting United States v. Cur-
tiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936), citing Worcester, 31 U.S. at
557). See also Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION
14-22, 63-72 (2d ed. 1996); see generally 2 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CON-
GRESS 1774-1789 (Worthington C. Ford ed., 1905).
292. 299 U.S. 304.
293. Id. at 318.
294. See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Affirmation of Tribal Criminal Jurisdiction Over
Nonmember American Indians, MICH. B.J., July 2004, at 24, 26; Washburn,
supra note 56, at 25.
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vestiture cases. But Congress essentially codified the implicit-divesti-
ture doctrine in its Duro fix-and the Court approved that
formulation. In short, there is no going back from implicit divestiture
and perhaps Cohen's normative statement is a dead letter. And, as
Professor Kevin Washburn stated, "Even though Lara was a victory in
an immediate sense, it moves tribes further down a doctrinal dead end
if the ultimate goal is a return to the constitutionally-envisaged role
for Indian tribes."295
The adoption and recognition of this "preconstitutional" federal
government power is satisfactory for the time being. But with two
new Justices heading to the Court and textualist Justices Scalia and
Thomas doubting the existence of such a "preconstitutional" power,
this doctrine might wither on the vine. Another theory is required.
V. CONSISTENT-WITH-FEDERAL-POLICY TEST
With several Justices questioning the foundations of federal Indian
law and with new appointees heading to the Court, the time is ripe for
a reconsideration of the Court's role as federal Indian policymaker.
Other commentators have suggested massive changes in federal In-
dian law, including the following: a constitutional amendment protect-
ing tribal sovereignty or explicitly providing for broad congressional
authority;296 congressional legislation authorizing federal courts to
provide a limited review of tribal court decisions;297 tribal or congres-
sional legislation expanding nonmember political rights within Indian
Country;298 a new paradigm of reviewing Indian cases;2 99 or either an
act of Congress or a Supreme Court opinion finding that Indian tribes
are simply no longer sovereign.30 0 The solution, however, must be one
295. Washburn, supra note 56, at 43. But see United States v. Gregg, No. CR 04-
30068, 2005 WL 1806345, at *1 (D.S.D. July 27, 2005) ("I reject the argument of
defendant that Morrison and Lopez have by way of implication overruled the
'wards of the nation' holdings in a line of cases beginning with United States v.
Kagama." (citation omitted)).
296. See FRANK POMMERSHEIM, BRAID OF FEATHERS (1995); Pommersheim, supra note
36, at 757-58.
297. See L. Scott Gould, Tough Love for Tribes: Rethinking Tribal Sovereignty After
Atkinson and Hicks, 37 NEW ENG. L. REV. 669, 685 (2003) (reporting that the
National Congress of American Indians might propose congressional legislation
allowing limited federal court review of tribal court decisions).
298. See Skibine, supra note 36, at 34 (reporting a tribal attempt to lobby for a "Hicks
fix").
299. See Frickey, supra note 30, at 1142; Washburn, supra note 56, at 43.
300. Cf United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 226 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("We
might find that the Federal Government cannot regulate the tribes through ordi-
nary domestic legislation and simultaneously maintain that the tribes are sover-
eigns in any meaningful sense.").
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with "sufficient cultural connection [with] roots deep enough to with-
stand the inevitable conflicting pressures."30 1
This Article proposes something much simpler and more fair-the
partial adoption of the test proposed by Justice Thomas in his concur-
rence in United States v. Lara-the consistent-with-federal-policy
test. It would allow the Court to review exercises of inherent tribal
authority with a semblance of consistency under a rubric of its own
making.
A. Justice Thomas's Lara Concurrence
United States v. Lara3 02 involved an appeal of a federal conviction
of Billy Jo Lara for assaulting a federal law enforcement officer. 30 3
Mr. Lara, a member of the Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indi-
ans, had been excluded from the Spirit Lake Tribe's reservation due to
a series of domestic violence convictions.3 04 He returned to the Spirit
Lake reservation and then assaulted an arresting officer who was
cross-deputized as both a tribal and federal officer. 3 05 After the tribe
convicted Mr. Lara of assaulting the officer, the federal government
prosecuted him for the same offense.306 Mr. Lara argued that the fed-
eral prosecution violated the Double Jeopardy Clause.307
Normally, concurrent tribal and federal prosecutions are not
barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause under the dual-sovereignty ex-
ception.30 8 The Court had previously affirmed that Indian tribes had
inherent authority to prosecute tribal members, 30 9 but not non-Indi-
ans3 10 or people classified as "nonmember Indians."3 1 i Since Mr.
Lara is a "nonmember Indian," the Court would have held that the
Spirit Lake Tribe had no inherent authority to prosecute him under
Duro v. Reina.31 2
301. Frickey, (Native) American Exceptionalism, supra note 27, at 488 (citing Robert
C. Post, The Supreme Court, 2002 Term-Foreword: Fashioning the Legal Consti-
tution: Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 HARv. L. REV. 4 (2003)).
302. 541 U.S. 193.
303. See id. at 197.
304. See United States v. Lara, No. C2-01-58, 2001 WL 1789403, at *1 (D.N.D. Nov.
29, 2001); Fletcher, supra note 294 at 24, 26.
305. See Lara, 541 U.S. at 196-97.
306. See id. at 197.
307. See id.
308. See id. (citing Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 88 (1985)); United States v.
Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 332 (1978) (upholding concurrent tribal and federal prose-
cutions of a tribal member).
309. See Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 322-23.
310. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 212 (1978).
311. See Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 679 (1990).
312. See id. However, as Justice Kennedy noted in his concurrence, Mr. Lara never
appealed his tribal court conviction. See Lara, 541 U.S. at 214 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
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However, Congress attempted to reverse (or at least rectify) Duro
in 1991 by enacting amendments to the Indian Civil Rights Act that
would "'recognize and affirm' in each tribe the 'inherent' tribal power
(not delegated federal power) to prosecute nonmember Indians for
misdemeanors. 3 13 Lara's argument was that once the Court made a
determination that a tribe's inherent authority had been implicitly
divested, no act of Congress could reverse that determination.314 As
such, the authority exercised by the Spirit Lake Tribe was delegated
federal authority, not inherent tribal authority. 3 15 A finding that Con-
gress had merely delegated its authority to Indian tribes would make
the federal prosecution unconstitutional under the Double Jeopardy
Clause.
The real question in Lara was whether Congress could reverse a
determination by the Court that a portion of tribal inherent authority
had been implicitly divested by the Court through the re-affirmation
of tribal inherent authority. The Court concluded that Congress could
re-affirm that authority.316
Lara was a 7-2 decision, suggesting that it stands on firm prece-
dential footing for the time being, even with two new Justices on the
Court. But upon closer review, at least one of the Justices in the ma-
jority, Justice Kennedy, ruled on the narrow grounds that Mr. Lara
had not appealed his tribal court conviction-a position to which Jus-
tice Thomas was sympathetic. 3 1 7 Justice Kennedy, in particular,
would have voted the other way if the matter had reached the Court
upon direct appeal by Mr. Lara of his tribal court conviction. 3 18
Justice Thomas questions whether Congress has plenary and ex-
clusive authority over Indian affairs as opposed to the Executive
313. Lara, 541 U.S. at 199 (citations and alterations omitted). This was known as the
"Duro fix." See LaRock v. Wis. Dept. of Revenue, 621 N.W.2d 907, 914 (Wis.
2001); see generally Alex Tallchief Skibine, Duro v. Reina and the Legislation that
Overturned It: A Power Play of Constitutional Dimensions, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 767
(1993).
314. This is the holding of the Eighth Circuit sitting en banc. See United States v.
Lara, 324 F.3d 635, 640-41 (8th Cir. 2003) (en banc).
315. See id. However, as noted by the Assistant United States Attorney who prose-
cuted the matter, Janice Morley, see Fletcher, supra note 294, at 26, the United
States circumvented Mr. Lara's strategy to rely on the Double Jeopardy Clause
by arguing that the tribal conviction was either done through inherent tribal au-
thority or was not valid at all. See Brief for the United States at 43-44, United
States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004) (No. 03-107), 2003 WL 22811829. In any
event, Mr. Lara's strategy would have resulted in the affirmation of his convic-
tion regardless of whether the Duro fix was constitutional.
316. See Lara, 541 U.S. at 196.
317. See id. at 214 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 217 n.1 (Thomas, J., concurring).
318. See id. at 211 (Kennedy, J. concurring) (calling "most doubtful" the court's hold-
ing that "the Constitution authorizes Congress to permit tribes, as an exercise of
their inherent tribal authority, to prosecute nonmember Indians").
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Branch and, implicitly, the states.3 19 He questions whether Indian
tribes retain any inherent sovereignty at all 320 and questions Indian
law decisions that tribes have held in reverence for decades, such as
United States v. Wheeler.32 1 Given these breathtaking comments, it
should be no surprise that Justice Thomas's concurrence has been ad-
dressed in numerous commentaries since its publication. 3 22
Nevertheless, contained within Justice Thomas's concurrence are
the seeds for a very useful paradigm for the Court to use when analyz-
ing its Indian law cases. For Justice Thomas, the cases underlying
Lara-United States v. Wheeler and Duro v. Reina-"make clear that
conflict with federal policy can operate to prohibit the exercise of [tri-
bal inherent] sovereignty." 3 23 In fact, Justice Thomas argues Oli-
phant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe is a case that exemplifies the
Court's reliance on the "views of Congress and the Executive
Branch."32 4 Oliphant and Duro are not cases about "inherent sover-
eignty"-they are "classic federal-common-law decisions" 3 25 in which
the Court must examine the underlying federal Indian policy. Justice
Thomas, in a critical passage, points out that certain "authoritative
pronouncements of the political branches make clear that the exercise
of [inherent tribal] sovereignty is not inconsistent with federal pol-
icy."3 2 6 In other words, because Congress has no clear textual author-
ity to limit or authorize the exercise of tribal inherent authority, the
Court is left not to enforce or uphold the actual legislation, but the
underlying federal Indian policy. As such, if the exercise of tribal in-
herent sovereignty conflicts with expressed federal Indian policy, only
then would the Court invalidate exercises of tribal inherent
sovereignty.
319. See id. at 218-19 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("But the States (unlike the tribes) are
part of a constitutional framework that allocates sovereignty between the State
and Federal Governments and specifically grants Congress authority to legislate
with respect to them . . . ." (citing U.S. CONST., amend. XIV, § 5)).
320. See id. at 219 ("The tribes, by contrast, are not part of this constitutional order,
and their sovereignty is not guaranteed by it.").
321. See id. at 215 ("I believe that the result in Wheeler is questionable.").
322. See Bethany R. Berger, United States v. Lara as a Story of Native Agency, 40
TULSA L. REV. 5, 23 (2004); Frickey, (Native) American Exceptionalism, supra
note 27, at 470-72; Robert Laurence, Don't Think of a Hippopotamus: An Essay
on First Year Contracts, Earthquake Prevention, Gun Control in Baghdad, the
Indian Civil Rights Act, the Clean Water Act, and Justice Thomas's Separate
Opinion in United States v. Lara, 40 TULSA L. REV. 137, 146-53 (2004); Alex
TallchiefSkibine, United States v. Lara, Indian Tribes, and the Dialectic of Incor-
poration, 40 TULSA L. REV. 47, 53 (2004); Melissa L. Tatum, Foreward, Sympo-
sium: Tribal Sovereignty and United States v. Lara, 40 TULSA L. REV. 1, 3-4
(2004); Washburn, supra note 56, at 42.
323. Lara, 541 U.S. at 220-21 (Thomas, J., concurring).
324. Id. at 221.
325. Id. at 220.
326. Id. at 222.
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Justice Thomas explains that tribal inherent authority in Indian
Country remains vested because, as "[p]urely 'internal' matters," they
are "unlikely to implicate federal policy."32 7 In contrast, the exercise
of tribal inherent sovereignty outside the borderlines of Indian Coun-
try and the exercise of tribal inherent sovereignty that affects non-
members implicates federal Indian policy. In Lara, Congress made a
clear statement of federal Indian policy sufficient to satisfy Justice
Thomas for the time being-"[s]pecifically, Congress 'recognized and
affirmed' the existence of 'inherent power ... to exercise criminal ju-
risdiction over all Indians."' 328
Justice Thomas, despite the thinly veiled warnings that he would
vote to eradicate congressional acts in favor of tribal sovereignty if
provided the opportunity (perhaps with a petitioner challenging the
constitutionality of the Indian Civil Rights Act329), acknowledges that
federal Indian policy as articulated by Congress might be sufficient to
permit tribes to exercise certain forms of inherent authority.
B. Explicit Federal Indian Policy Should Drive Federal
Indian Common Law Relating to the Inherent
Authority of Indian Tribes
Misgivings about the motivations of Justice Thomas aside, the con-
sistent-with-federal-policy test provides an excellent avenue for re-
storing certainty and predictability in federal Indian law and re-
establishes Congress as the primary federal Indian policymaker, re-
lieving the Court of this burden and temptation. This test mostly
avoids the problem of a lack of constitutional grounding for congres-
sional authority in Indian affairs while respecting the intent of the
Founders to provide exclusive authority to the federal government.
Finally, the test provides the "fairly clean analytical structure"330 the
Court has been seeking since the Marshall Trilogy itself.
Yet, Justice Thomas omits mention of examples of cases consistent
with this test-Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe,331 New Mexico v.
Mescalero Apache Tribe,332 and California v. Cabazon Band of Mis-
sion Indians.33 3 Merrion involved the inherent authority of Indian
tribes to exercise the governmental power to tax-in that case, non-
327. Id. at 221.
328. Id. at 222 (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2000)).
329. See Means v. Navajo Nation, 432 F.3d 924 (9th Cir. 2005) (rejecting challenge to
the constitutionality of the prosecution of a nonmember Indian in accordance
with the Indian Civil Rights Act); Morris v. Tanner, 288 F. Supp. 2d 1133 (D.
Mont. 2003) (same).
330. Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 470 (1984).
331. 455 U.S. 130 (1982).
332. 462 U.S. 324 (1983).
333. 480 U.S. 202 (1987).
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Indian-owned businesses. 334 The Court identified the relevant con-
gressional federal Indian policy as "'fostering tribal government"335
in concluding that "'[iut simply does not make sense to expect the
tribes to carry out municipal functions approved and mandated by
Congress without being able to exercise at least minimal taxing pow-
ers, whether they take the form of real estate taxes, leasehold taxes or
severance taxes.'"336 The Merrion Court also quoted from an 1879
Senate Judiciary Committee report that articulated the Committee's
understanding that Indian tribes "undoubtedly" retain the inherent
right to taxation.3 3 7
The Mescalero Apache Court relied on the Executive Branch's ac-
tions as well as the explicit statements of federal Indian policy by Con-
gress. That case decided that the State of New Mexico's attempt to
enforce its hunting and fishing laws against individuals who engaged
in those activities on tribal lands had been pre-empted by the opera-
tion of federal law.338 The Court noted that the economic develop-
ment activities undertaken by the tribe had been financed and
supported by federal agencies under federal law, such as the Indian
Financing Act.3 3 9 The Court's analysis relied on congressional state-
ments of federal Indian policy in favor of tribal self-governance and
tribal economic development. 3 4o Indeed, the Court concluded, as it
had in earlier cases, that congressional federal Indian policy in favor
of "tribal self-sufficiency and economic development" was
"overriding."341
In Cabazon Band the Court rejected the State of California's at-
tempt to impose its laws and regulations relating to tribal high-stakes
bingo.34 2 The Court relied on the statements of congressional federal
Indian policy, noted in the Mescalero Apache decision, that Congress's
334. See Merrion, 455 U.S. at 134-36.
335. Id. at 138 n.5 (quoting Washington v. Confed. Tribes of the Colville Indian
Reserv'n, 447 U.S. 134, 155 (1980)).
336. Id. (quoting Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 617 F.2d 537 (10th Cir. 1980) (Mc-
Kay, J., concurring), affd, 455 U.S. 130 (1982)).
337. Id. at 140 (quoting S. REP. No. 45-698, at 1-2 (1879)).
338. See New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 325 (1983).
339. See id. at 327 n.3 ("Financing for the complex, the Inn of Mountain Gods, came
principally from the Economic Development Administration (EDA), an agency of
the United States Department of Commerce, and other federal sources. In addi-
tion, the Tribe obtained a $6 million loan from the Bank of New Mexico, 90% of
which was guaranteed by the Secretary of the Interior under the Indian Financ-
ing Act of 1974, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1543, and 10% of which was guaranteed by
Tribal funds. Certain additional facilities at the Inn were completely funded by
the EDA as public works projects, and other facilities received 50% funding from
the EDA.").
340. See id. at 335 n.17.
341. Id. at 335 (quoting White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 143
(1980)).
342. See California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 221-22 (1987).
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interest in encouraging "tribal self-sufficiency and economic develop-
ment" was "overriding."343 Moreover, the Court relied on the fact that
the Executive Branch had encouraged and even assisted Indian tribes
in developing gaming operations for economic development
purposes.3 4 4
Merrion, Mescalero Apache, and Cabazon Band took seriously ex-
plicit congressional statements of federal Indian policy and Executive
Branch actions in concluding that the exercise of tribal inherent au-
thority was consistent with federal Indian policy. Under such a test,
congressional federal Indian policy permits Indian tribes to regulate
nonmembers. The Court reached its holding utilizing an analysis con-
ducive to Justice Thomas's proposal to rely on statements of congres-
sional policy. The following subsections take up Justice Thomas's
suggestion to revisit critical federal Indian law cases,34 5 by applying
the consistent-with-federal-policy test.
1. Revisiting Hicks and Its "Open" Question
In Nevada v. Hicks,346 the Supreme Court held that tribal courts
do not have jurisdiction over a civil suit brought by a tribal member
against a state officer for actions taken on Indian lands.347 That deci-
sion has been subject to intense scholarly criticism, 348 but not on the
question of whether the Court complied with explicit statements of
federal Indian policy. In fact, the majority opinion in Hicks did not
discuss federal Indian policy at all.
If one were to analyze the decision in Hicks under the consistent-
with-federal-policy test, one would ask if Congress stated a policy that
would permit an Indian tribe to exercise civil jurisdiction over a state
officer. The place to start is the Tribal Justice Act.3 4 9 Subsections 4
through 6 of Congress's statement of federal Indian policy contained
in the Act support the view that Indian tribes have inherent civil adju-
343. Id. at 216 & n.19 (citing New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324,
335 n.17 (1983)).
344. See id. at 217-18.
345. See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 224 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring).
346. 533 U.S. 353 (2001).
347. Id. at 374.
348. See Robert N. Clinton, Comity and Colonialism: The Federal Courts' Frustration
of Tribal- Federal Cooperation, 36 Amz. ST. L.J. 1, 37 (2004); Clinton, There Is
No Federal Supremacy Clause, supra note 56, at 229-34; Getches, Beyond Indian
Law, supra note 27, at 278-79, 329-36; Sarah Krakoff, Undoing Indian Law One
Case at a Time: Judicial Minimalism and Tribal Sovereignty, 50 AM. U. L. REV.
1177, 1233-37 (2001); Frank Pommersheim, Tribal Courts and Federal Courts: A
Very Preliminary Set of Notes for Federal Courts Teachers, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 63,
74-76 (2004); Singer, supra note 36, at 647-48; Suagee, supra note 223, at
104-05.
349. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (2000).
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dicatory authority over all nonmembers. 3 50 Subsection 5, in particu-
lar, states that "tribal justice systems are an essential part of tribal
governments and serve as important forums for ensuring public
health and safety and the political integrity of tribal governments."35 1
There is a strong argument that the State of Nevada's contention that
tribal courts can never have jurisdiction over its officers-even for al-
leged civil rights violations against tribal members that occur on In-
dian lands-directly implicates the political integrity of the tribe.352
Applying the consistent-with-federal-policy test, there would be ample
authority to support a conclusion that Congress would permit an In-
dian tribe to civilly adjudicate a state official in such circumstances.
In addition, Justice Scalia's concern about the state's interest in
preventing Indian reservations from "'becoming an asylum for fugi-
tives from justice"'353 is a question for Congress. As has been re-
peated numerous times in this Article, it is not for the Court to make
federal Indian policy. Congress can hold the requisite hearings, take
the necessary testimony, and admit the documentary and statistical
evidence to prove whether or not Indian Country is truly becoming an
asylum for fugitives from justice. That is the function of Congress.
Hicks left open the question of whether Indian tribes may assert
civil adjudicatory jurisdiction over nonmembers who are not state offi-
cials. 3 54 This would be an easier analysis because the state interest in
law enforcement is not present. Again, applying the consistent-with-
federal-policy analysis, a court would conclude that Congress's explicit
policy statements favoring tribal court development and jurisdiction
and tribal self-governance in general would mandate a conclusion that
no federal Indian policy exists that would warrant the divestiture of
tribal court jurisdiction.
350. See id. § 3601(4)-(6).
351. Id. § 3601(5) (emphasis added).
352. Cf. Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 395-96 (2001) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("The
actions of state officials on tribal land in some instances may affect tribal sover-
eign interests to a greater, not lesser, degree than the actions of private parties.
In this case, for example, it is alleged that state officers, who gained access to
Hicks' property by virtue of their authority as state actors, exceeded the scope of
the search warrants and damaged Hicks' personal property.").
This is not a hypothetical concern. In the years since Hicks, state officials
have taken violent law enforcement actions against Indians and Indian tribes on
trust lands. See Fletcher, supra note 14, at 1-4 (discussing Rhode Island law en-
forcement officials' raid on a Narragansett Indian Tribe's smokeshop); Fletcher,
supra note 126, at 799-800 (discussing raids by the States of Washington and
Kansas on tribal lands, and planned invasion of the Seneca Nation by the State of
New York).
353. See Hicks, 533 U.S. at 364 (quoting Fort Leavenworth R.R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 U.S.
525, 533 (1885)).
354. See id. at 358 n.2 ("Our holding in this case is limited to the question of tribal-
court jurisdiction over state officers enforcing state law. We leave open the ques-
tion of tribal-court jurisdiction over nonmember defendants in general.").
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2. Revisiting Atkinson Trading
In Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley,35 5 decided within weeks of
Hicks, the Court held that Indian tribes may not tax non-Indian-
owned businesses located on non-Indian lands within the Navajo Na-
tion Reservation. 3 56 The Court applied the famous Montana rule,3 57
derived from its Montana v. United States358 decision. The Montana
rule is that "the inherent sovereign powers of an Indian tribe do not
extend to the activities of nonmembers of the tribe."359 There are two
exceptions, known as Montana 1 and Montana 2. Montana 1 provides
that "[a] tribe may regulate, through taxation, licensing, or other
means, the activities of nonmembers who enter consensual relation-
ships with the tribe or its members, through commercial dealing, con-
tracts, leases, or other arrangements." 360 Montana 2 provides that
"[a] tribe may also retain inherent power to exercise civil authority
over the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within its reservation
when that conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the political
integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the
tribe."36 1 To date, the Court has yet to find any circumstances that
meet either of these two exceptions. 3 62
In 1982, the Court decided that Indian tribes retain the power to
tax nonmembers as a portion of their retained inherent authority.3 6 3
In 1985, the Court further affirmed the inherent authority of Indian
tribes to tax nonmembers. 36 4 The only distinction relevant to the
Court between those cases and Atkinson Trading was that the activi-
ties of the petitioners seeking immunity from Navajo taxation were
located on non-Indian-owned land.365
The Atkinson Trading Court did not engage in a discussion of ex-
plicit federal Indian policy relating to tribal taxation or economic de-
velopment. As noted earlier in the discussion about Merrion,36 6 which
discussed federal Indian policy at length, tribal taxation is necessary
to "foster[] tribal self-government."3 67 Unlike Hicks, there was not
355. 532 U.S. 645 (2001).
356. Id. at 659.
357. Id. at 647.
358. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
359. Id. at 565.
360. Id. (citations omitted).
361. Id. at 566 (citations omitted).
362. See Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 360 (2001). But see Merrion v. Jicarilla
Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 137 (1982).
363. See Merrion, 455 U.S. at 137.
364. See Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Navajo Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 195 (1985).
365. See Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645, 647-48 (2001).
366. See supra section V.B.
367. See Merrion, 455 U.S. at 138 n.5 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Washington v. Confed. Tribes of Colville Indian Reserv'n, 447 U.S. 134, 155
(1980)).
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even an argument about a state or other competing interest in Atkin-
son Trading. Indeed, Arizona likely did not tax these properties at
all. 368
Federal Indian policy supported the exercise of the tribal tax in
Atkinson Trading; indeed, it actively supported it. Since Merrion,
Congress has spoken twice on the subject of tribal economic develop-
ment and tribal government self-sufficiency. In the Tribal Tax Status
Act, Congress stated that its intent was to "create the development
environment necessary for true economic and social self-suffi-
ciency."369 And in the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, Congress
stated that its intent was to contribute to its own policy of "promoting
tribal economic development, self-sufficiency, and strong tribal gov-
ernments." 370 Without the authority to tax, tribes cannot become self-
sufficient. As part of its federal Indian policy, Congress permits tribes
to tax nonmembers located within Indian Country. The consistent-
with-federal-policy test may require the Court to reconsider the Mon-
tana rule and the two exceptions, or not, but the Court's resolve to
never find a circumstance where either exception applies must
change.
3. The Trickier Case-Revisiting Oliphant
Like Hicks, Oliphant has been criticized by Indian law scholars. 3 71
Oliphant involved a pair of petty criminals who were non-Indians ar-
rested by the Suquamish tribal police during the Suquamish Tribe's
annual Chief Seattle Days. 3 7 2 The Court had no direct precedent on
the matter, so it relied upon a collection of odds and ends of federal
Indian legal authority 373 to reach a conclusion that Indian tribes are
368. Cf generally Wilkins, supra note 14, at 482-85 (describing the positive intergov-
ernmental relations between the State of Arizona and the Navajo Nation).
369. See Williams, supra note 138, at 357 (citing 127 CONG. REC. S5666-67 (daily ed.
June 2, 1981) (statement of Sen. Wallop)).
370. 25 U.S.C. § 2702(1) (2000).
371. See CLINTON, GOLDBERG & TsOSIE, supra note 5, at 560 (citing William C. Canby,
Jr., The Status of Indian Tribes in American Law Today, 62 WASH. L. REV. 1, 18
n.57 (1987)); Russel Lawrence Barsh & James Youngblood Henderson, The Be-
trayal: Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe and the Hunting of the Snark, 63
MINN. L. REV. 60 (1979); Frickey, (Native) American Exceptionalism, supra note
27, at 457-58; Getches, Beyond Indian Law, supra note 27, at 274; Ralph W.
Johnson & Berrie Martinis, Chief Justice Rehnquist and the Indian Cases, 16
PUB. LAND L. REV. 1, 11-12 (1995); see also John P. LaVelle, Petitioner's Brief-
Reargument of Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 13 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
69, 78 n.35 (2003) (citing authorities).
372. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 194 (1978).
373. See id. at 197 (discussing pre-Civil War treaties with the Shawnee and Choctaw
tribes); id. at 199 (citing 2 Op. Att'y Gen. 693 (1834); 7 Op. Att'y Gen. 174 (1855));
id. at 199-200 (citing Ex parte Kenyon, 14 F. 353 (W.D. Ark. 1878)). Most notori-
ous was then-Justice Rehnquist's citation to a Solicitor's Opinion that had been
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no longer possessed of the inherent authority to prosecute non-
Indians. 3 74
A few weeks later, the Court decided in United States v. Wheeler 3 75
that Indian tribes possess the authority to prosecute their own mem-
bers. Regarding the tribal criminal jurisdiction cases, Justice Thomas
made clear that he believed "that the result in Wheeler is questiona-
ble."376 However, Justice Thomas also goes on to agree that "[plurely
internal matters are by definition unlikely to implicate any federal
policy."3 7 7 Wheeler is not the most difficult case to be revisited under
the consistent-with-federal-policy test. That case concerned the crimi-
nal prosecution of tribal members by Indian tribes, an internal matter
to be sure.3 78 The more difficult case is, by far, Oliphant v. Suquam-
ish Indian Tribe, a case where an Indian tribe attempted to prosecute
a non-Indian. Indeed, Justice Thomas pointed to Oliphant as an ex-
ample of the Court's previous successful application of the consistent-
with-federal-policy test.3 79
However, one would be mistaken to hold out Oliphant as a success-
ful example of the application of a consistent-with-federal-policy test.
Justice Thomas noted in Lara, "[Tihe Court in Oliphant carefully ex-
amined the views of Congress and the Executive Branch." 38 0 But, as
scholars have noted, all then-Justice Rehnquist concluded-in Justice
Thomas's words, after "discussing treaties, statutes, and views of the
Executive Branch [and] discussing Attorney General opinions"3 8 1-
was that there had been an "unspoken assumption" that the federal
government believed that Indian tribes did not possess criminal juris-
diction over non-Indians. 38 2 For all of the Court's looking, it didn't
find any explicit statement of federal Indian policy.
Applying the test, what federal Indian policy does apply? By nega-
tive implication, 38 3 at least, the Duro fiX384-the congressional over-
ruling of Duro v. Reina that held tribes have no inherent power to
prosecute nonmember Indians 3 85-suggests that Congress has in-
tended for tribes to posses inherent authority to punish nonmembers
Indians and members only, and not non-Indians. But Duro presup-
withdrawn by the Department of Interior. See id. at 201 & n.ll (citing Criminal
Jurisdiction of Indian Tribes over Non-Indians, 77 Interior Dec. 113 (1970)).
374. See id. at 209-12.
375. 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
376. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 215 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring).
377. Id. at 221.
378. See, e.g., Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883).
379. See Lara, 541 U.S. at 221 (Thomas, J., concurring).
380. See id.
381. Id.
382. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 203 (1978).
383. But see Frickey, supra note 30, at 1157-58.
384. See 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2000); Lara, 541 U.S. at 197-98.
385. See Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 679 (1990).
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poses that tribes do not already possess the inherent power to prose-
cute non-Indians. What about Oliphant in the first instance?
The analysis under the consistent-with-federal-policy test contains
a bright-line rule in case of pure congressional silence. It is, in es-
sence, a return to the Cohen formulation. We know that Congress had
never spoken in statutory form about the inherent authority of tribes
to prosecute non-Indians or else the Court would not have adopted the
"unspoken assumption" formulation. 38 6 And the test posits that
where Congress has not spoken, then nothing prohibits the exercise of
tribal inherent authority. Under this test, the Court decided Oliphant
wrongly.
C. The Act of 1871 and "Residual Sovereignty"
Justice Thomas would part ways with the consistent-with-federal-
policy test proposed by this Article because of the default rule in cases
where Congress is silent. He certainly approves of the way Oliphant
was decided, 38 7 but he also seriously doubts that there can be residual
inherent tribal authority at all.388 Justice Thomas and others suspi-
cious of tribal sovereignty should not be suspicious of the shifting of
the default rule contained in the consistent-with-federal-policy test.
In fact, as noted earlier, the Court's implicit-divestiture doctrine con-
tained a similar limitation before the Rehnquist Court shifted the
rule.38 9 At one time, the doctrine of implicit divestiture read like this:
If an overriding national concern compels it, an aspect of an Indian
tribe's inherent sovereignty can be implicitly divested.3 90 The Rehn-
quist Court wrote the rule like this: If a power is inconsistent with a
tribe's dependent status, then that aspect of inherent sovereignty can
be implicitly divested. 391 The Court has changed its threshold from
one of "overriding national interest" to "inconsistent with dependent
status." These are not synonymous. The Court has much more leeway
to decide that a power is inconsistent with its dependent status than if
it were deciding whether a power is inconsistent with the national in-
terest. Changing the test smacks of writing the law to reach a particu-
lar result. The consistent-with-federal-policy test would relieve the
Court of its policymaking and policy-deciding burden.
Justice Thomas also admits that he reads more into the Act of 1871
than one that merely "purported to prohibit entering into treaties with
386. See Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 203.
387. See Lara, 541 U.S. at 221 (Thomas, J., concurring).
388. See id. at 219.
389. See section III.A.
390. See Washington v. Confed. Tribes of the Colville Indian Reserv'n, 447 U.S. 134,
153 (1980).
391. See Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 359 (2001).
2006]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
the 'Indian nation[s] or tribe [s]. ' "392 Ignoring that federal Indian pol-
icy now supports tribal sovereignty, Justice Thomas argues that per-
haps "federal policy [as articulated by the 1871 Act] itself could be
thought to be inconsistent with this residual-sovereignty theory."3 93
For Justice Thomas, the 1871 Act "reflects the view of the political
branches that the tribes had become a purely domestic matter."394
Since Indian tribes most definitely maintain inherent sovereignty
supported by federal Indian policy, the only way Justice Thomas's ar-
gument makes sense is if one agrees to a more fundamental argument
he makes: "The Federal Government cannot simultaneously claim
power to regulate virtually every aspect of the tribes through ordinary
domestic regulation and also maintain that the tribes possess any-
thing resembling 'sovereignty.'"395
But here, Justice Thomas overstates his case and ignores a basic
tenet of current federal Indian policy. Not only does the federal gov-
ernment not choose to regulate "virtually every aspect of the tribes," it
has expressly disclaimed its intention to do so by adopting clear and
unambiguous statements of federal Indian policy supporting tribal
self-determination.
Justice Thomas's arguments evidence a deeper symptom of judicial
arrogance-Justice Thomas simply does not believe that Indian tribes
should retain any sovereignty at all. 3 96 It does not matter to him that
Congress has chosen for the United States to support tribal sover-
eignty. It also does not matter to him that the Executive Branch exe-
cutes the wishes of Congress. The open question for tribes in this
dangerous time is: How many other Justices think the same way as
Justice Thomas? All he needs are four votes. He may already have
some of them.3 97
Until the Court steps back from the role of plenary federal Indian
policymaker, a role that violates the basic precepts of the Constitu-
tion's system of separation of powers, it will continue to remain a dan-
gerous time for Indian tribes.
392. Lara, 541 U.S. at 218 (Thomas, J., concurring).
393. Id.
394. Id.
395. Id. at 225.
396. Professor Frickey suggested that some Justices have a "sense that Congress has
failed to step in and fix a myriad of festering local problems by eliminating tribal
authority." Frickey, (Native) American Exceptionalism, supra note 27, at 460.
397. See Laurence, supra note 322, at 151-53 (discussing Justice Scalia's view of tribal
sovereignty).
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D. The Limitations of the Consistent-with-Federal-Policy
Test
As noted at the beginning of this Article, Congress is slow in react-
ing to the rapid changes in federal Indian law and the advances made
by progressive Indian tribes. There may be circumstances where an
Indian tribe takes action in accordance with its inherent authority
that Congress or other branches of the federal government have not
considered. For example, Indian tribes are beginning to exercise crim-
inal jurisdiction over non-Indian aliens 3 98 and exercising civil con-
tempt authority in order to jail non-Indians. 3 99 Indian tribes might
also begin exercising civil forfeiture against non-Indians or prosecute
non-Indians using a civil infractions system. 400 No branch of the fed-
eral government is ready to opine on these issues.
And the federal government doesn't need to say anything. Under
the consistent-with-federal-policy test as envisioned here, congres-
sional silence means a reversion back to the Cohen formulation
whereby Indian tribes retain inherent authority absent congressional
expression. Unless Congress speaks to these issues, Indian tribes re-
tain those authorities.
Another more critical issue is whether Congress will continue to
support tribal self-determination. It was not so long ago that the will
of Congress was to terminate Indian nations rather than develop
them.40 1 In that case, tribes would begin to rely more on the federal
courts for relief from the changing political winds. One may question
how the Court is to view the actions of Indian tribes where current
legal trends, based on old federal Indian policy or common law, would
likely foreclose tribal authority or immunity. For example, in 1960-
near the end of the Termination Era-the Court decided Federal
Power Commission v. Tuscarora Indian Nation.40 2 Based on dicta in
that decision,4 03 most federal circuits have decided that federal em-
ployment laws of general applicability will apply to Indian tribes un-
398. See Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians v. Torres, Nos. 03-143, 1529-1530-1531,
1819 (E. Band of Cherokee Indians Sup. Ct. Apr. 12, 2005), http'/www.tribal-
institute.org/opinions/2005.NACE.0000007.htm.
399. See Order of Contempt, Bear Soldier Dist. v. Bear Soldier Indus. (Standing Rock
Sioux Tribal Ct. Aug. 18, 2004) (on file with author); INTRODUCTION TO TRIBAL
LEGAL STUDIES, supra note 144, at 156 (quoting JERRY GARDNER, TRIBAL LAW AND
POLICY INSTITUTE, TRIBAL EFFORTS TO ADDRESS PROBLEMS PRESENTED BY THE
LACK OF TRIBAL CRIMINAL JURISDICTION (1997)).
400. See INTRODUCTION TO TRIBAL LEGAL STUDIES, supra note 144, at 155-56 (quoting
GARDNER, supra note 399).
401. See supra section II.A.
402. 362 U.S. 99 (1960).
403. See id. at 116 ("[A] general statute in terms applying to all persons includes Indi-
ans and their property interests.").
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less certain narrow exceptions are met.40 4 Should federal courts
applying the new test construe the dicta from Tuscarora consistent
with federal Indian policy of the 1960s or from the twenty-first cen-
tury? As a result, is a federal statute's meaning changed because of a
new direction in the political winds?
The answer to this concern is not simple. It is similar to the revisi-
tation of the Oliphant case discussed above. Many times, but not all,
the consistent-with-federal-policy test's default rule-the silence of
Congress operates to allow the Indian tribe's exercise of inherent au-
thority-will answer this concern. But Congress is a fickle creature,
and Indian tribes should remain absolutely vigilant to prevent an-
other termination or assimilationist era.
E. Concerning the Sovereignty of Indian Nations
Finally, Indian advocates may object to a proposal that results in
the acknowledgment that Indian tribes could be divested of inherent
authority without tribal consent. As Justice Thomas himself noted,
"The tribes either are or are not separate sovereigns ....*"4o5 Some
scholars have long argued that Felix Cohen's 1941 formulation406 and
its affirmation407-that Indian tribes could be divested of inherent tri-
bal sovereignty by Congress-was yet another colonialist formulation.
These scholars also suggest that Cohen's formulation, later adopted by
the Court in cases such as United States v. Wheeler and approved of in
later editions of his Handbook, should be rejected in favor of a rule
that Indian tribes can be divested of authority only if they explicitly
agree. 408 But, we must also acknowledge that tribal advocates have
for decades argued in support of Cohen's formulation-and more im-
portantly, it is a much better formulation than allowing the Court to
give in to its temptation to implicitly divest Indian tribes of their in-
herent authority. Moreover, Indian tribes have been successful of late
in Congress, helping to defeat the worst of anti-tribal legislation pro-
posed in the last few decades.409
404. See Singel, supra note 12, at 695.
405. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 215 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring).
406. See, e.g., Russel Lawrence Barsh, Felix S. Cohen's Handbook of Federal Indian
Law, 1982 Edition, 57 WASH. L. REV. 799, 800-01 (1983) (book review).
407. See id. at 801-02.
408. See id. at 803-04.
409. See WILKINSON, supra note 4, at 267-68. But see Transportation Equity Act, tit.
X, § 10211, H.R. 3, 109th Cong. (2d Sess. 2005) (removing authority of Oklahoma
tribes to regulate environmental quality); Letter from James G. Sappier, Chief of
the Penobscot Nation & Chairman of the Nat'l Tribal Envtl. Council, to President
George W. Bush (Aug. 5, 2005), http://www.ntec.org/National-News/transporta-
tionbillletter.pdf; cf. Babcock, supra note 36, at 569 ("Congress may now be the
preferred forum ....").
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Adopting the consistent-with-federal-policy test could create a use-
ful convergence of Indian law scholarship and Justice Thomas's con-
servatism. While Justice Thomas relied on the 1871 Act as evidence
that perhaps no residual tribal sovereignty remains, he also asserts
that the Act is "constitutionally suspect."4 10 Perhaps Justice Thomas
suspects that Congress does not have the authority to take that action,
a position Indian law scholars have long taken.411 In fact, numerous
Indian law scholars have long argued that Congress does not have au-
thority to legislate on the internal affairs of sovereign tribal govern-
ments.4 12 These Indian law scholars and Justice Thomas would agree
that the Act, which, as Professor Sarah Cleveland stated, "essentially
stripped the Indians of any future treatying capacity [without tribal
consent], "413 is unconstitutional. Indeed, Justice Thomas also doubts
that Congress has authority to regulate the internal affairs of Indian
tribes.4'4 Given the adoption of the consistent-with-federal-policy
test, the work of these Indian law scholars provides a detailed and
well-researched foundation for Supreme Court analysis.
It is without question a major gamble to place so much faith in
Congress given the way the political winds can change direction so
410. Lara, 541 U.S. at 218 (Thomas, J., concurring).
411. As Professor Clinton wrote:
While the constitutionality of the 1871 federal statute ending Indian
treaty-making has never been questioned, there are significant reasons
to question the constitutionality of the statute ending Indian treaty-
making. First, the statute purported to prohibit the exercise of the
treaty-making power which, under Article I of the Constitution, is allo-
cated to the President of the United States. A federal statute prohibiting
the President from exercising one of his constitutionally assigned duties
seems to pose significant separation of powers problems, even if the Sen-
ate ultimately must ratify negotiated treaties. Second, while not ex-
pressed on the face of the statute, by effectively converting the
presidentially initiated treaty-making process into a legislative process,
the 1871 statute might be thought to aggrandize congressional power at
the expense of the executive branch, thereby posing a different separa-
tion of powers concern. Third, by effectively substituting a process of
statutory approval of Indian agreements for the Senate treaty ratifica-
tion process prescribed in Article II, Congress has, by statute, attempted
to amend the constitutionally prescribed Congressional process for
treaty approval.
Clinton, There Is No Federal Supremacy Clause, supra note 56, at 168-69 (foot-
notes omitted). See also Prakash, supra note 9, at 1102 n.206.
412. E.g., Clinton, There Is No Federal Supremacy Clause, supra note 56, at 118
("[Tihere is no federal supremacy clause for Indian tribes and that any federal
legislative activity that might affect Indian tribes or their lands requires their
formal consent, through treaty or analogous procedure."); Robert Odawi Porter,
The Inapplicability of American Law to the Indian Nations, 89 IowA L. REV. 1595
(2004); Porter, supra note 9, at 950-53; Singer, supra note 56, at 43; Skibine,
supra note 36, at 45.
413. Cleveland, supra note 56, at 50.
414. See Lara, 541 U.S. at 226 (Thomas, J., concurring) (encouraging the Court 'to
ask ... whether Congress . . . has th[e] power [to adjust tribal sovereignty]").
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quickly. It is also dangerous to advocate for the federal courts to read
these political winds. In discussing Professor Frickey's recent sugges-
tion that the Court should learn to live with ambiguity,415 Professor
Singer worried that such an "approach to Indian law may be helpful to
Indian nations, but, applied in the wrong way and with the wrong val-
ues, it could erode tribal rights and powers even further."416 The con-
sistent-with-federal-policy test may suffer from the same weakness.
But the road Indian tribes are walking right now leads to legal and
political extinction. Justice Thomas is the origin of this proposal, but
he has also opened a door that might not be shut any time soon, a door
that leads to the end of this business we call federal Indian law.
Gerald Vizenor has written and spoken of the compromises made
by Indians and Indian tribes as a question of "survivance."417 Tribes
that agreed to Christianize in exchange for not being forcibly removed,
according to Vizenor, have committed an act of survivance.4 18 Indians
that gave up their language in exchange for not being beaten or killed
committed an act of survivance. 4 19 Tribes that agreed to cede most of
their territory in exchange for protection from non-Indian predators
and state governments committed acts of survivance.4 20 Tribes that
opened their reservation borders to non-Indian gaming management
companies and non-Indian gainers in exchange for revenue that pays
for government services have committed acts of survivance. 42 1 Indian
poets and novelists who write about the horrors of growing up on dev-
astated reservations commit acts of survivance. 42 2
415. See Frickey, (Native) American Exceptionalism, supra note 27, at 487-89.
416. Singer, supra note 27, at 3.
417. See generally GERALD VIZENOR, MANIFEST MANNERS: NARRATIVES OF POST INDIAN
SURVvANCE (1994).
418. See Gerald Vizenor, Professor of Am. Studies, Univ. of N.M., Native American
Narratives: Resistance and Survivance, Address at North Dakota State Univer-
sity (Apr. 22, 2005) [hereinafter Vizenor Address]; see also JAMES A. CLIFTON,
THE POKAGONS, 1683-1983: CATHOLIC POTAWATOMI INDIANS OF THE ST. JOSEPH
RrVER VALLEY (1984) (discussing the Pokagon Band of Catholic Potawatomi Indi-
ans who were permitted to stay in their homeland in southwest Michigan).
419. See Vizenor Address, supra note 418; see also BILL DUNLOP & MARCIA FOUNTAIN-
BLACKLIDGE, THE INDIANS OF HUNGRY HoLLow (2004) (describing, via first-hand
account, Indian boarding school abuses perpetrated on Michigan Odawas).
420. See Vizenor Address, supra note 418; see also Peter Jacques, Sharon Ridgeway &
Richard Witmer, Federal Indian Law and Environmental Policy: A Social Con-
tinuity of Violence, 18 J. ENvTL. L. & LITIG. 223, 231-34 (2003) (describing Treaty
of Medicine Creek Lodge).
421. See Vizenor Address, supra note 418; see also Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa &
Chippewa Indians v. U.S. Att'y for the W. Dist. of Mich., 369 F.3d 960 (6th Cir.
2004); Associated Press, Northern Michigan Tribe Plans Larger Casino, GRAND
RAPIDS PRESS (Mich.), July 2, 2005, at B3, available at 2005 WLNR 10592639
(describing the Victories Casino owned by the Little Traverse Bay Bands of
Odawa Indians).
422. See, e.g., N. SCOTT MOMADAY, HOUSE MADE OF DAWN (1968); SIMON J. ORTIZ,
FROM SAND CREEK: RISING IN THIS HEART WHICH IS OUR AMERICA (1981); LESLIE
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Advocating for adoption of the consistent-with-federal-policy test is
also an act of survivance. If the choice is between heading toward le-
gal and political extinction and adopting a legal doctrine that gives
Indian tribes a fighting chance, then perhaps there is no choice.
MARMON SILKO, CEREMONY (1977); cf. Sherman Alexie, Dignity, 3 SEATTLE J. FOR
SoC. JUST. 469 (2005).
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